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LUTHER V. BORDEN:  A TANEY 
COURT MYSTERY SOLVED* 
LOUISE WEINBERG† 
 
Abstract 
It has not been generally remarked that Chief Justice Taney 
wrote surprisingly few of the Taney Court’s major opinions—those 
cases that tend to be anthologized and remembered by generalists.  
Those major cases which Taney did write are consistently about 
slavery (or states’ rights or state powers, which in Taney’s mind 
may have amounted to the same thing).  There is a notable 
exception:  Luther v. Borden—a case about the Guarantee Clause.  
This raises a question.  Setting aside his opinions on slavery or 
states rights, what could have moved the author of Dred Scott, by 
consensus the worst Supreme Court opinion in history, to choose 
Luther v. Borden as one of the few remembered major opinions he 
did write? To begin to unravel this little mystery of history, a 
glimpse into the character and judgment of Roger Brooke Taney is 
offered, with an amusing parallel drawn between the respective 
nominations to the Supreme Court of Taney and Robert Bork.  
Luther is reconsidered in light of the Transcripts of Record, and 
with an unembarrassed presentism rather than historicism.  In 
view of Chief Justice Warren’s thinking in Powell v. McCormack, 
much of Chief Justice Taney’s reasoning in Luther is shown not 
only to be evasive, illogical and unconvincing, but also 
intellectually dishonest, if he is to be credited with the 
understandings of law and its processes reasonably attributable to 
a former Attorney General of the United States.  Even more 
disturbingly, Luther v. Borden can plausibly be read as having a 
darker side than is conventionally understood, with an impact of 
surprising magnitude and hurtfulness, placing it well within the 
ambitions of the author of Dred Scott. 
_____________________________________________________________ 
       * This paper was presented at a faculty colloquium at the University of 
Texas Law School, April 27, 2017. My thanks for good comments there or in 
draft from Sam Bray, Willy Forbath, Jack Getman, John Golden, Tom 
McGarity and David Robertson.   
       † William B. Bates Chair in the Administration of Justice and Professor  
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Introduction:  A Little Mystery of History 
The Taney Court is generously remembered today as 
seeking a laudable accommodating balance between national 
and state powers—an early progressive example of cooperative 
federalism.  That is the received wisdom.  In view of this 
supposed achievement, Justice Scalia, to take an eminent 
example, did not hesitate to express admiration for the 
greatness of Taney’s Chief Justiceship, and to attribute to 
Taney a lasting regret1 for his fateful opinion in Dred Scott.2 
 
 1.  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1001-1002 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Those of us who know how the lustre of [Taney’s] 
great Chief Justiceship came to be eclipsed by Dred Scott cannot help 
believing [when viewing the Emanuel Leutze portrait of Chief Justice Taney] 
that [Taney] had that case—its already apparent consequences for the Court, 
and its soon-to-be-played-out consequences for the Nation—burning on his 
mind”).  Chris Eisgruber quipped that this was “the Dorian Gray Theory of 
Constitutional Jurisprudence.”  See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: 
Originalism’s Forgotten Past, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 37 (1993).  Justice 
Scalia’s admiring view of Taney has been predominant at least since the 
segregationist period in American history.  See, e.g., 1 HAMPTON L. CARSON, 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND ITS CENTENNIAL 
CELEBRATION 336 (1891) (commending the Taney Court, except for its slavery 
cases); Charles Noble Gregory, A Great Judicial Character, Roger Brooke 
Taney, 18 YALE L. J. 10 (1908) (commending Chief Justice Taney). 
 2.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1857) (holding, 
inter alia, that a black citizen of a state could never be a citizen of the United 
States):   
The question . . . arises, whether the . . . Constitution . . . embraced the 
negro African race [and] . . . put it in the power of a single State to 
make [a negro] a citizen of the United States. . . .  The court think[s] 
the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. 
Id. at 406.  However, the operative holding of the opinion was that Congress 
could not take slave property without due process of law, and therefore that 
the Missouri Compromise Act of 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545, was 
unconstitutional, since by it Congress made territories North of the 
Compromise line free in perpetuity, and a free territory might strip a visitor 
of his slave property if he simply entered it with his slave.  See infra note 28 
and accompanying text. 
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Yet there is something skew in such admiration, and 
something discordant in the attribution to Taney of a lasting 
regret for Dred Scott.3  My modest purpose here, embracing an 
instinctive skepticism and an unapologetic presentism,4 is to 
delve into a hitherto unremarked feature of the Taney Court, 
and an equally unremarked feature of Luther v. Borden,5 and 
to try to discover, through critical examination of the case in 
light of later understandings, how Luther coheres with Chief 
Justice Taney’s authorship in the seemingly unrelated case of 
Dred Scott v. Sandford. 
 
1. A Characteristic Preference for the Quotidian 
If the defining and most admired characteristic of the 
Taney Court was one of accommodation to state interests, that 
accommodation also must bear some responsibility for the 
Taney Court’s widely noted institutional weaknesses.  Given 
the inevitable incoherence of a state-accommodating position 
which could make serious inroads on John Marshall’s 
authoritative and pragmatic view of national powers in matters 
 
 3.  Readers of this essay will be familiar with the Court’s long descent 
from John Marshall’s largeness of vision to what amounted, at last, to a 
narrow anti-Lincoln obstructionism, culminating, even before the War, in 
Chief Justice Taney’s late blooming disingenuous nationalism in Ableman v. 
Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1859) (sustaining the constitutionality of 
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850).  Chief Justice Taney’s obstructionism during 
the Civil War is seen also in opinions he handed down when sitting on circuit, 
the most noted of which is Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 
1861) (No. 9,487) (holding that only Congress, and not the President, has the 
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, i.e., to declare martial law).  See 
generally CARL B. SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64 (rev. ed. 2010); R. 
KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY (2006); 
DANIEL A. FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION (2003).  See also, e.g., JAMES F. 
SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE 
PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS 12 (2006). 
 4.  See generally KARL POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM (2002) (1957) 
(arguing that placing past events strictly within the understandings of those 
events as perceived in their own times strips the historian of the critical 
faculty).  But see HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF 
HISTORY (1965) for the classic critique of presentism, at least when it is 
triumphalist.  Butterfield’s aversion to fatuous assumptions of progress, 
persuasive as it is, seems to me to invite moral relativism. 
 5.  Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/8
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of national concern,6 Chief Justice Taney would not, and with 
his state-favoring mindset probably could not, deliver the kind 
of guidance on the scope of national power that would have 
been needed to avoid his Court’s dividing over the issue, and, 
as if by force of habit, dividing over other issues as well.7  There 
was so little to unify the Court that the Justices not 
infrequently returned to the antique practice of writing 
opinions seriatim.8  A reported case could once more consist of 
the scattered opinions of individual Justices, leaving to lawyers 
the task of divining what, if anything, the Court had held, and 
to lament the want of an opinion for the Court.9 
What interests me here, however, is the curious fact that a 
good many of the Taney Court’s major cases could lack not only 
the authority of an opinion for the Court, but also the authority 
of an opinion for the Court by the Chief Justice.  Taney seems 
to have relinquished opinion-writing to the brethren in a 
surprising number of his Court’s most important cases. 
 
 6.  The splendid example, of course, is McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 
(1819), which—in the course of limning out the national powers over matters 
“necessary and proper” with visionary understandings of the Union, of the 
Constitution, and of constitutional interpretation—held that Congress has 
power to establish a national bank.  Id. at 325-26. 
 7.  See generally Arthur J. Jacobson, Publishing Dissent, 62 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1607, 1608 (2005); John P. Kelsh, The Opinion Delivery Practices of 
the United States Supreme Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 137, 141 
(1999). 
 8.  Dred Scott is a conspicuous example of this phenomenon.  Several 
Justices in Dred Scott were concerned about other issues, but in Chief Justice 
Taney’s opinion, which tradition makes the opinion of the Court, the core of 
the case was the constitutionality, under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, of the Missouri Compromise Act of 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545, insofar 
as that legislation might affect the liberty and “property” of travelers to the 
free territories from the slave states.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 
(1857).  See infra note 28 and accompanying text.  Justice Wayne, totting up 
the votes, concluded that six of the Justices, including the Chief Justice, 
agreed that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional.  Id. at 455. 
 9.  See, e.g., Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (The Passenger 
Cases); see also, e.g., Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), 
in which the Court was unanimous as to the result, but badly fractured as to 
the rationale. 
5
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By “important” cases, I mean cases likely to be 
anthologized and remembered now, that might well have been 
of obvious significance then, and that are not in specialty fields 
but instead are cases of general national interest, often 
constitutional cases.10  It is true that every Chief Justiceship is 
distinguished only by a small fraction of its cases.  But in great 
controversies a significant fraction will be written by the Chief, 
for the same reason Chief Justice Marshall wrote so many of 
his own major cases, and for the same reason Chief Justice 
Warren wrote, and put together a unanimous Court for Brown 
v. Board of Education:  to lend authority both to the case and to 
the Court. 
If you or I were called upon to cite a major opinion in the 
Taney Court, we might think at once of Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens,11 with its patient unraveling of interwoven federal 
and state powers.  But Cooley was written by Justice Curtis.  
The opinion in The Amistad,12 freeing the slaves involved in a 
bloody mutiny aboard ship,13 was written by Justice Story.  
Swift v. Tyson14 and Prigg v. Pennsylvania15 are cases lawyers 
 
 10.  Taney authored several well-regarded important opinions in fields 
that are the study of specialists rather than generalists.  In admiralty, for 
example, Taney wrote the opinion in the foundational case of The Genesee 
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1852), holding that the true test of 
territorial jurisdiction in admiralty cases is “navigable water,” and not the 
traditional test inherited from our British cousins, “within the ebb and flow of 
the tides.”  The Genesee Chief opened to admiralty jurisdiction our inland 
seas—the Great Lakes—and the Western rivers.  My colleague, John Golden, 
would add to this several commercial cases, including a major case in patent 
law, O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 124 (1853) (sustaining the patent for the 
Morse telegraph).  Importantly, it is in O’Reilly that it was held that there 
could be no patent for a natural phenomenon, for a law of nature, or for an 
abstract idea.  Id. at 115. 
 11.  Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (Curtis, J.). 
 12.  The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841). 
 13.  In our time, the interest of the case has been enhanced by Steven 
Spielberg’s film, Amistad (1997). 
 14.  Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that federal courts 
were free to provide an independent judgment as to the better rule in cases of 
general commercial law, notwithstanding state law to the contrary); 
overruled, Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 15.  Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (while holding that 
the nation could not commandeer a state to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act, 
also holding that slave-owners were at liberty to retrieve their fugitive slave 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/8
 706 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2 
see today as wrong, but they are remembered, and in their day 
were prominent and consequential.  The opinions in those cases 
were also written, however, not by Chief Justice Taney, but, 
again, by Story.  Sheldon v. Sill,16 to this day a pillar of the law 
of federal courts, was written by Justice Grier.  The Prize 
Cases17 were important to the Union’s Civil War effort, but 
were also written by Grier.  Chief Justice Taney joined Justice 
Nelson’s dissent.18 
It seems unlikely that the author of Dred Scott would be 
intimidated by any prospect of controversy.  Perhaps Chief 
Justice Taney preferred to influence outcomes indirectly, from 
behind the scenes.  Or, possibly, by falling in with uncongenial 
majorities, he may have sought an appearance of unity.  Or he 
may have wanted to keep in his own hands, at least, the 
assignment of the writing of opinions.  On the rare occasions 
when an opinion for the Court failed to satisfy him, Taney 
certainly was capable of extended dissent.19  But, for whatever 
reason, despite the almost 300 workaday opinions written by 
him during his long tenure, he wrote surprisingly few notable 
opinions for the Court.  With the exception of justly celebrated 
key cases in specialized fields,20 the big cases in the Taney 
 
property found in a free state). 
 16.  Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). 
 17.  67 U.S. 635 (1863). 
 18.  Id. at 683.  For other examples of Taney’s hostility to the Union’s war 
effort see supra note 3. 
 19.  See Haney v. Balt. Steam Packet Co., 64 U.S. (23 How.) 287 (1859); 
Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1857); Thomas v. Osborn, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) 22 (1856); Converse v. Burgess, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 413 (1855); Williams 
v. Gibbes, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 239 (1854); Bd. of Trs. v. Indiana, 55 U.S. (14 
How.) 268 (1852) (in which Justices Catron and Daniel also dissented); the 
better-known case of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 
U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851) (in which Justice Daniel also dissented in an 
opinion in which the Chief Justice joined); Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 
How.) 495 (1850); and the famous “Passenger Cases,” Smith v. Turner, 48 
U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).  I am finding only one other dissent before 1849. in 
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).  Chief Justice 
Taney purported to concur in the judgment in Justice Story’s opinion in 
Prigg, 41 U.S. at 626, but essentially dissented where he believed Story had 
been too liberal, or too expansive of national power.  Id. at 627 ff. 
 20.  See supra note 10, on Taney’s great cases in admiralty and patent 
law. 
7
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Court too often cannot boast the dignity of an opinion for the 
Court by its Chief Justice. 
 This is a most puzzling preference for the quotidian.  Are 
we seriously to congratulate the author of Dred Scott for his 
humility?  For an unselfish deference to the views of his 
colleagues in matters of national interest?21 
But there is an important exception.  There is one category 
of opinions of great general interest that Taney did write.  
These opinions form an exception to Taney’s preference for 
workaday business.  These were his opinions on slavery.22  And 
the telling feature of Taney’s slavery cases is that they 
typically take positions that protect and even facilitate slavery. 
A prime example is Taney’s opinion in Strader v. Graham 
(1850), holding that only the law of an escaped slave’s domicile 
of origin could determine the status, slave or free, of that 
slave—thus stripping a free state of power to free a slave under 
its own law.23  In Strader, Taney went so far as to hold that 
there was no federal jurisdiction over the question of slave 
status,24 thus confiding the issue thenceforth to the tender 
mercies of a slave state. 
 
 21.  For the improbability of these suggestions, see 1 GEORGE TICKNOR 
CURTIS, A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, LL.D. 192 (Benjamin R. 
Curtis ed. 1879) (recording Justice Curtis’s resignation; describing the 
internecine struggle over the timing of Chief Justice Taney’s publication of 
his final opinion in Dred Scott, and revealing that Taney had withheld the 
final opinion from the Associate Justices until its publication). 
 22.  Taney also wrote several opinions about states’ rights—the so-called 
“police” powers once thought reserved, perhaps exclusively, to the states.  In 
his mind these rights or powers were crucial to slavery.  Among the more 
important of Taney’s state powers cases, I would include Charles River 
Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1937).  At least, tradition assigns the 
authorship of the opinion in that case to Chief Justice Taney, although he 
kept his name out of the report.  But one of the most important Taney Court’s 
federalism cases, Cooley v. Board of Wardens, supra note 11, was written by 
Story.  I should also remind the reader that Taney occasionally assigned the 
writing of major opinions on slavery Story.  See, e.g., The Amistad, supra note 
12, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, supra note 15. 
 23.  Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82, 88 (1850). 
 24.  Id. at 94, 96. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/8
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Taney’s slavery cases, of course, include Dred Scott v. 
Sandford (1857).25  There, arguing that black persons could 
never be citizens and had no rights,26 Chief Justice Taney went 
on to strike down the Missouri Compromise of 1820, an Act of 
Congress,27 as unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.  Taney took the position that the Missouri 
Compromise unconstitutionally authorized deprivations of 
slave “property” North of the Missouri Compromise line.  
Furthermore, Taney declared, the Missouri Compromise 
deprived a slave-owner of liberty—his liberty to travel with his 
slaves into free territory: 
Thus, the rights of property are united with the 
rights of person, and placed on the same ground by the 
fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that 
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, 
without due process of law.  And an act of Congress which 
deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or 
property, merely because he came himself or brought his 
property into a particular Territory of the United States, 
and who had committed no offence against the laws, 
could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of 
law.28 
Other of Taney’s opinions display this same concern for 
slave “property.”  Think about Ableman v. Booth (1859).29  
There, in a case involving an abettor of a slave escape, the 
Wisconsin high court boldly declared unconstitutional30 the 
harsh Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.31  Under the authority of that 
 
 25.  Dred Scott v. Sandford,  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 26.  Id. at 406. 
 27.  Act of 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545, establishing that all territories north 
of a line 36° 30’ degrees of parallel, save Missouri, were free in perpetuity.  
Taney was quite right that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional.  
But its constitutional defect was not that it endangered the taking of slave 
property above the 36° 30’ line, as Taney held, but, as we can now see, below 
that line it tacitly permitted slavery. 
 28.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S., at 450. 
 29.  Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). 
 30.  In re Booth, 3 Wis. 13, 48-49 (1854), rev’d sub nom. Ableman v. Booth, 
62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). 
 31.  Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (amending the Fugitive Slave 
9
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legislation, bounty hunters could cross into a free state, kidnap 
some unfortunate black resident, and spirit him away into a 
slave state.  The Wisconsin high court went so far as to try to 
block review in the Taney Court by declining to hand up the 
certified record of the case on writ of error.32  Chief Justice 
Taney, for the Court, went ahead with the case anyway, an 
uncertified copy having been found,33 and reversed, sustaining 
the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act.34 
Luther v. Borden35 is the single notable exception to 
Taney’s general disinclination to write an opinion for the Court 
in constitutional cases having nothing to do with slavery or 
states’ rights.  What could have moved the author of Dred Scott 
to select, among the few major constitutional cases in which he 
did take up his pen, to write the opinion in Luther v. Borden?  
Why was Luther, a case about the arcana of the Guarantee 
Clause, of special interest to him?  But before we approach that 
question, it will be useful to pause briefly to consider the ideas 
and character of Roger Brooke Taney. 
 
Act of 1793). 
 32.  See Louise Weinberg, Methodological Interventions and the Slavery 
Cases:  Night-Thoughts of a Legal Realist, 56 MD. L. REV. 1316, 1357 (1997) 
(terming this event in the Wisconsin court “surreal.”  This history indicates a 
nationwide understanding of Chief Justice Taney’s pro-slavery predilections, 
and the pro-slavery leanings of the Taney Court generally. 
 33. See Weinberg, Methodological Interventions, supra note 32, at 1358:  
“At this point an almost surreal thing happened.  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court instructed its clerk not to respond to the Supreme Court’s writ of 
certiorari, not to comply with the Court’s request for a certified copy of the 
record, and not to record the High Court’s demand.  For some reason, the 
local assistant U.S. attorney in Milwaukee, J. R. Sharpstein, obtained a 
certified copy of the record before the Wisconsin clerk was instructed to 
withhold it.  After months of futile jockeying and a delay of years, the United 
States Supreme Court went ahead and reviewed the case on the basis of 
Sharpstein’s copy.” 
 34. Ableman, 62 U.S., at 525-26 (holding that state courts have no power 
to release anyone in federal custody, thus supporting the Fugitive Slave Act.  
The Act was repealed in 1864.  Act of June 28, 1864, 13 Stat. 200.  After the 
War, the Chase Court reached the same result in Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 397, 411-12 (1871) (holding that a state court had no power to release a 
Union soldier detained for deserting). 
 35.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S., at 393; Luther, 48 U.S., at 1. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/8
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2.  Who Was Roger Brooke Taney? 
Roger Brooke Taney was born on a Maryland tobacco 
plantation worked by slaves, and his views, I think, are best 
understood as permanently in sympathy with those of the 
South.36  He was born to the planter aristocracy, raised in a big 
house servanted by slaves, and moved in Maryland’s high 
planter world.  He married the daughter of his neighbor, the 
wealthy poet, Francis Scott Key. 
Early in his political career Taney was an opportunistic 
Federalist, but he transformed himself easily into an anti-
Federalist when power swung away from the old party.  
Eventually, notwithstanding Andrew Jackson’s rough ways 
and Southern populist views, Taney became an ardent 
Jacksonian Democrat.  Jackson’s racist contempt for black and 
Indian Americans suited Taney, as did Jackson’s populist 
antagonism to Northern banks, federal tariffs, and national 
powers. Taney’s views did not change.  His was an unshakable 
ideology of states’ rights, at least to the extent that that 
ideology served slave-state interests—as Dred Scott would 
make all too plain.  Throughout the Civil War, whether his 
opinions continued in their characteristic anti-nationalist vein 
or could boast a late-blooming national patriotism,37 the Chief 
Justice appears to have done what he could, particularly when 
sitting on circuit,38 to thwart Lincoln’s prosecution of the War. 
 
 36.  SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD, supra note 3, at 677-92.  See generally 
Strader, 51 U.S. (10 How.) at 89 (holding that the status, slave or free, of an 
escaped slave, was determinable exclusively by the law of the slave state 
from which the slave fled).  “[I]t is insisted that [the slaves’] employment in 
Ohio had made them free when they returned to Kentucky. . . .  There is 
nothing in the Constitution of the United States that can in any degree 
control the law of [a slave state] upon this subject.”  Id. at 93-94.  See also the 
disingenuous late-blooming nationalism of Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 
How.) 506, 526 (1859) (sustaining the harsh Fugitive Slave Act of 1950). 
 37.  On Ableman, see supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.  
 38.  The most egregious instance is Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 
(C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487) (holding that only Congress, not the President, 
has the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, i.e., to declare martial 
law). See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION  (2003); BRIAN 
MCGINTY, LINCOLN AND THE COURT (2008); SIMON, supra note 3, at 12.  
Compare Michael J. C. Taylor, “A More Perfect Union”: Ableman v. Booth and 
11
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Taney’s fervor for the Southern cause, and anger over what 
Southerners perceived as Northern aggression, can be seen, for 
example, in an intemperate, not to say unhinged, letter to his 
son-in-law, written in the summer just before the decision in 
Dred Scott.  There, Taney luridly confided his fear that “[t]he 
South is doomed to sink to a state of inferiority, and the power 
of the North will be exercised to gratify their cupidity and their 
evil passions. . . .”39 
But even aside from this rabid preoccupation with 
Southern grievances,40 there was, I think, a deficiency of 
character, as well as a want of judgment in the man.  One 
revealing story, an account of Taney’s ascent to the Chief 
Justiceship of the United States Supreme Court, may suffice to 
give us a glimpse into Taney’s character, viewpoints, and 
judgment.41 
 
3. History Repeats Itself:  A Tale of Two Nominations 
Let us travel back in time to the Marshall Court in its 
Jacksonian twilight.  It is 1833; we are in the second term of 
President Andrew Jackson.42  We find Jackson, invigorated by 
his re-election, returning to his obsessive war on central 
banking.43  Jackson had thought to kill the Second Bank of the 
 
the Culmination of Federal Sovereignty, 28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 101, 115 (2003), 
with Louise Weinberg, Methodological Interventions and the Slavery Cases; 
or, Night-Thoughts of a Legal Realist, 56 MD. L. REV. 1316, 1325, 1358 (1997). 
 39.  Letter from Roger Brooke Taney to Mason Campbell, reprinted in 
SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD, supra note 3, at 609. 
 40.  For an account of antebellum grievances, legitimate and imagined, 
see Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
97 (2007).  
 41.  I have provided a similarly brief glimpse into the judgment and 
character of John Marshall in recounting how Marshall came to be 
nominated to the Chief Justiceship.  That portrait makes an interesting 
contrast with Chief Justice Taney’s ascendancy to the Court.  See Louise 
Weinberg, Our Marbury, 89 VA. L. REV. 1235, 1245-60 (2003).  
 42.  For background, see ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON (2d ed. 
1999); (John T. Morse ed. 1899).  
    43.  Jackson’s thinking was in the Jeffersonian and populist tradition of 
visceral distrust of the Bank and other of Hamilton’s fiscal ideas, as favoring 
the development of an oligarchy.  See James Willard Hurst, Alexander 
Hamilton, Law Maker, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 483, 493 (1978) (ascribing 
contemporaneous opposition to Hamilton’s fiscal plan to a view of Hamilton 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/8
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United States44 by vetoing Congress’s anticipatory renewal of 
its charter.45  But although his veto did kill the renewal of the 
Bank’s charter, the Bank itself lived on under its existing 
charter.  Jackson brooded on the question of how to destroy the 
Bank immediately and utterly.  At length, Jackson decided to 
deliver a blow calculated to be fatal.  He would remove the 
federal government’s deposits from the Bank.  Jackson’s 
further plan, in keeping with his spoils system, was to place 
the national moneys in scattered crony state banks. 
Congress had foreseen this willful attack on the nation’s 
financial system.  When Jackson set about removing the 
deposits he was acting in defiance of an earlier resolution of 
Congress declaring that the national moneys must be left in 
the Bank.46  To be sure, a congressional resolution could be 
defied.  But Jackson discovered that it was no easy matter to 
get the deposits removed.  From our perspective it would seem 
that if the credit of the Bank of the United States was to be 
dealt such a blow, a severe credit crisis—a panic—was likely to 
ensue.47 What reasonably competent Secretary of the Treasury 
 
as “determined to create a large, permanent public debt, to help put the 
country under governance of a wealthy oligarchy”).  Writers point out that 
there was considerable corruption in the Bank; the petitioner in McCulloch v. 
Maryland was hardly innocent.  See William L. Reynolds, Maryland and the 
Constitution of the United States: An Introductory Essay, 66 MD. L. REV. 923, 
939 (2007) (describing serious corruption at the Bank in Maryland).  For 
optimistic views of the national debt. see JOHN STEELS GORDON, HAMILTON’S 
BLESSING:  THE EXTRAORDINARY LIFE AND TIMES OF OUR NATIONAL DEBT 
(1997); and of central banking, see ROGER LOWENSTEIN, AMERICA'S BANK: THE 
EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE FEDERAL RESERVE (2015). 
 44.  Jackson’s eventual triumph over the Bank explains how the United 
States came to muddle along without central banking until 1863, when, in 
the agony of Civil War, the Republican Congress, cleared of southern 
members, finally restored central banking to the United States.  National 
Bank Act, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863).  In this the radical Republican 
Congress exercised the national power envisioned by Chief Justice Marshall 
in the case sustaining the power of Congress to establish a national bank, the 
case that had enraged Southerners more than any other, McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 45.  See generally PAUL KAHAN, THE BANK WAR (2015); JOHN T. 
HOLDSWORTH, THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 90-98 (1910). 
 46.  See CONGRESSIONAL SERIAL SET 38 (1893). 
 47. In those days, every bank could issue its own notes, but could refuse to 
accept notes when loans were called in, some even refusing to accept their 
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would be party to such recklessness? 
Amusingly, if one can be amused by really bad governance, 
what ensued was a nineteenth-century version of the 
“Saturday Night Massacre.”48  The “Saturday Night Massacre,” 
it may be recalled, was one of the more shocking events of the 
“Watergate” crisis.  “Watergate” is the name by which 
historians remember the scandal that, in 1974, forced the only 
resignation of an American president, Richard Nixon.  There 
had been a break-in at the offices of the Democratic National 
Committee, located in the Watergate building complex in 
Washington, D.C.  The culprits turned out to have connections 
with the Committee to Re-Elect the President (with its 
stranger-than-fiction acronym, “CREEP”).49  CREEP, alas, had 
 
own notes.  It was not improbable that with withdrawal of the federal moneys 
the Bank of the United States would call in its loans, and not improbable that 
a cascade of bank failures in the states would follow, with resulting panic and 
depression.  And indeed, panic and depression did follow upon removal of the 
national moneys from the Bank.  In their nature, banks are not fully 
capitalized, since they use depositors’ money in speculative lending or other 
investments.  There was no program then of federal deposit insurance.  
Panics and depressions were common and lasting.  See generally HOWARD 
BODENHORN, STATE BANKING IN EARLY AMERICA: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 
(2003); ERNEST LUDLOW BOGART, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1923); A BRIEF HISTORY OF PANICS IN THE UNITED STATES (Clement 
Juglar & Decourcey W. Thom eds., 1916).  These sources variously describe 
the antebellum financial system as even more fragile than our current 
financial system. 
 48.  The following account is a composite drawn from many sources, 
including JAMES KIRKPATRICK DAVIS, THE SATURDAY NIGHT MASSACRE:  WHAT 
REALLY HAPPENED ON OCTOBER 20, 1973 (2015); CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB 
WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (2014); STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS 
OF WATERGATE: THE LAST CRISIS OF RICHARD NIXON (1992); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (on certiorari before judgment, to review Judge 
Sirica’s denial of the President’s motion to quash the District Court’s third-
party subpoena duces tecum directing the President to produce certain tape 
recordings and documents relating to the prosecution of former government 
officials and presidential campaign officials in connection with the Watergate 
break-in and cover-up); United States v. Mitchell, 377 F.Supp. 1326 (DDC 
1974) (in a prosecution of the Attorney General); see also JOHN SIRICA, TO SET 
THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE BREAK-IN, THE TAPES, THE CONSPIRATORS, THE 
PARDON (1979).  Judge Sirica was the federal district judge issuing the fateful 
subpoena. 
 49.  Mark Curriden, The Lawyers of Watergate:  How a “Third-Rate 
Burglary” Provoked New Standards for Lawyer  Ethics, 98 A.B.A. J. 36 (June, 
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connections with Nixon’s administration.  An independent 
prosecutor, Archibald Cox, was appointed to investigate the 
break-in.50  But Cox was not, in fact, “independent.”  A former 
Solicitor General who had returned to teaching at Harvard 
Law School, Cox had been named to the independent 
prosecutor post by Nixon’s own Attorney General, Elliot 
Richardson.51  Perhaps Cox should not have accepted this 
inside appointment.  Perhaps he should have insisted that an 
actually independent prosecutor be appointed by independent 
means, perhaps by the Senate Judiciary Committee.  But Cox 
did accept it, and Elliot Richardson assured the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that, notwithstanding this tie to the 
administration, the independent prosecutor would indeed be 
independent.52 
Initially, Cox probably believed that Nixon’s aides bore sole 
responsibility for the break-in.  But, doubtless to his surprise, 
his own investigation was becoming increasingly focused on the 
President himself.  It was beginning to appear that Nixon had 
a rôle, certainly in a cover-up of the break-in, and perhaps even 
in the break-in itself.  As the case against President Nixon 
became less unclear, Nixon must have been hard driven, for he 
quite shockingly demanded Cox’s resignation.53  With every 
appearance of rising to the occasion, Cox refused to resign.54  
But Cox was not taking the stance that might have been hoped 
for in an independent prosecutor.  Cox did not stand on the 
high ground of his independence.  Cox apparently believed, 
contrary to Elliot Richardson’s assurances to Congress, that he, 
Cox, could have no power independent of the administration 
 
2012). 
 50.  See op. cit. supra note 48. 
 51.  See George Lardner, Jr., “Cox Is Chosen as Special Prosecutor, 
Democrat Served Under Kennedy as Solicitor General,” Washington Post 
(May 19 1973), at A01. 
 52.  Op. cit. supra note 48. 
 53.  For Bork’s own account of this and other events of that night, see 
Robert Bork, SAVING JUSTICE—WATERGATE, THE SATURDAY NIGHT MASSACRE, 
AND OTHER ADVENTURES OF A SOLICITOR GENERAL (2013). 
 54.  Jonathan L. Entin, Learning the  Right Lesson from Watergate: The 
Special Prosecutor and the Independent Counsel, 20 CHAP. L. REV. 151 (2016).  
The Chapman symposium is particularly comprehensive. 
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that had authorized his appointment.55  So Cox simply made 
the technical argument that, since Attorney General Elliot 
Richardson had hired him, only Elliot Richardson could fire 
him.  Nixon accordingly ordered Elliot Richardson to fire the 
“independent” prosecutor.  Richardson, no doubt mindful of his 
assurances to the Senate Judiciary Committee, refused to do it.  
On Saturday night, October 20, 1973, Nixon fired Elliot 
Richardson.56 
Nixon then ordered the Deputy Attorney General, William 
Ruckelshaus, to fire Cox.  But Ruckelshaus, no more desirous 
of infamy than Elliot Richardson, refused as well.  Nixon then 
fired Ruckelshaus.57 
When the smoke of the Saturday Night Massacre58 cleared, 
the only ranking Justice Department official left standing was 
Nixon’s wispy-bearded Solicitor General, Robert Bork.  Nixon 
forthwith appointed Bork Attorney General for the purpose, 
and, the world watching, transfixed, Bork forthwith 
shamelessly fired the “independent” prosecutor.59  Cox’s 
proffered prerequisite, although now detached from Elliot 
Richardson, was satisfied, as far as he, Cox, was concerned.  
And so, Archibald Cox, the “independent” prosecutor, all too 
obediently bowed out.60  (Yet, it would seem that a Justice 
Department appointee could not be required to resign, in 
ordinary course, should the Attorney General resign; nor, 
would it seem, that a successor Attorney General could require 
him or her to resign without cause.  Moreover, the independent 
duty with which Cox had been charged was ongoing, and I 
should think there was every reason for him, in this national 
 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See generally Maurice N. Nessen, Stonewall:  The Real Story of the 
Watergate Prosecution, 1997 COLUM. L. REV. 963. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Carroll Kilpatrick, “Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, 
Ruckelshaus Quit: President Abolishes Prosecutor’s Office; FBI Seals 
Records.”, Washington Post (Oct. 21, 1973), at A1. 
 59.  Although, after firing Cox, President Nixon had declared his intention 
to put an end to the very office of independent prosecutor, see id., in the face 
of outcry, he appointed Leon Jaworski Special Prosecutor to take Cox’s place. 
 60.  Supra note 58. 
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crisis, to stand his ground.61) 
In 1982, President Ronald Reagan chose to name Robert 
Bork to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, presumably for Bork’s academic 
credentials,62 rather than his hatchet job for President Nixon.  
On the D.C. Circuit bench, even more obviously than in his 
Yale classroom, Bork soon revealed himself, in the eyes of his 
critics, as a rigid reactionary.  In 1987, President Reagan 
attempted to promote Judge Bork to a place on the Supreme 
Court, nominating him to an Associate Justiceship to replace 
Lewis Powell.63  But, after bitter hearings,64 during which 
 
 61.  Disclosure: At Harvard, I was among the ten hand-picked students in 
Archibald Cox’s constitutional-law seminar.  (“I had thought you to be Mr., 
not Mrs.,” Cox said accusingly, as it was my turn to introduce myself.)  In 
extenuation of Cox’s awfulness on that occasion, I confess that I was as blind 
to it at the time as Cox was.  Cox was equally blind to the purport of his war 
stories, and this I did see for what it was.  He boasted to us that, as Solicitor 
General in the Kennedy Administration, in arguing to the Court in the 
desegregation and “sit-in” cases of that period, his effort had been to provide 
the Court with “prudent” alternatives to striking down segregationist state 
laws under the Constitution.  Instead, Cox focused his arguments on narrow 
definitions of state “trespass” laws and similar expedients, enabling him to 
“spare” the Supreme Court from having to establish the constitutional rights 
of black Americans.  (My colleague, John Robertson, tells me he shares these 
uncomfortable memories of Cox’s pride in this tactic.)  Cox was a true 
believer in “the passive virtues” that had been so important to New Dealers.  
See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Foreword: The 
Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).  These were also the virtues of 
Louis Dembitz Brandeis, and, further back, of James Bradley Thayer.  But in 
Cox’s hands (as in our own times), the passive virtues simply persuaded 
courts not to provide remedies for proved wrongs. 
 62.  Robert Bork was a law professor and the author of an influential book 
on antitrust law when President Reagan nominated him to the D.C. Circuit. 
 63.  See Jason Manning, The Bork Nomination, at 
http://eightiesclub.tripod.com/id320.htm, accessed on April 17, 2017; Stanley 
I. Kutler, The Shadow of Watergate: Legal, Political, and Cultural 
Implications, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1743 (1994). 
 64.  Congress’s treatment of Bork during his confirmation hearings gave 
rise to a new verb: “To bork, 1980s: from the name of Robert Bork (1927–
2012), an American judge whose nomination to the US Supreme Court (1987) 
was rejected following unfavorable publicity for his allegedly extreme views.”, 
at https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=to+bork.  It is still complained that 
Bork was unfairly depicted during the hearings as an extremist, out of step 
with mainstream American thinking.  Id.  Cf. THE BORK HEARINGS, 
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION BATTLE 
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Senator Edward Kennedy controversially, but perhaps 
accurately, warned that in Bork’s America, women would once 
again face back-alley abortions, the Senate rejected Bork.65  
Efforts today to crush what remains of Roe v. Wade,66 not 
without success in the Supreme Court,67 have rendered 
predictions such as Kennedy’s less dismissible.  But in rejecting 
Bork, it seems as likely that the Senate acted in revulsion over 
Bork’s part in the Saturday Night Massacre as over his threat 
to legal abortion (or even over the wispy beard). 
The story of Roger Brooke Taney’s successful ascent to the 
Chief Justiceship68 bears some striking and amusing parallels 
to the story of Robert Bork’s nomination to the Court.  Indeed, 
in the end both men’s nominations to an Associate seat on the 
Supreme Court failed, and for similar reasons.  The difference 
is that Taney enjoyed a second nomination, his fateful 
nomination to the Chief Justiceship. 
 
IN U.S. HISTORY (Ralph E. Shaffer ed. 2005).  Subsequently, Bork became a 
best-selling author of right-wing tracts.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, 
SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH:  MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 
(2010); ROBERT H. BORK, A COUNTRY I DO NOT RECOGNIZE:  THE LEGAL ASSAULT 
ON AMERICAN VALUES (2005); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1979). 
 65.  On This Day: Senate Rejects Robert Bork for the Supreme Court, 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER. (Oct. 23, 2016), http://blog. 
constitutioncenter.org/2016/10/on-this-day-senate-rejects-robert-bork-for-the-
supreme-court/. 
 66. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 67. See, e.g., Gonzales v.  Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 166-67 (2007) (sustaining 
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003); 
reasoning that the outlawed procedure was not considered necessary for the 
health of mothers).  But see Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) 
(striking down a state anti-abortion law to similar effect because of its failure 
to provide for the health of the mother).  See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (sustaining numerous features of a Pennsylvania anti-
abortion law, except its provision for spousal notification). 
 68. The following account is freely drawn from ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW 
JACKSON AND THE BANK WAR (1967) and CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. 
TANEY (1935). 
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In 1833, as President Andrew Jackson became determined 
to remove the United States deposits from the Bank of the 
United States, it turned out that only the Secretary of the 
Treasury was authorized to move the national moneys.69  Louis 
McLane, Jackson’s Secretary of the Treasury, understandably 
declined to carry out this attack on the nation’s credit.  But 
McLane managed to insulate himself from the fury of the 
choleric President—if less successfully from the reproach of 
history.  Although he was unwilling to carry out this particular 
order, he assured the President he was quite content to let 
somebody else do it.  So the two men amicably agreed that 
McLane’s portfolio should be shifted from Treasury to State 
when State opened up. 
Accordingly, as there was then a reshuffling of the cabinet 
in the wake of resignations over a private squabble, Jackson 
was able to move McLane from Treasury to State and to hand 
the Treasury portfolio to William J. Duane.  Jackson forthwith 
ordered Duane, his new Secretary of the Treasury, to remove 
the federal deposits from the Bank.  To Jackson’s fury, Duane, 
like his predecessor, was not insane, and refused to plunge the 
country into economic disaster.  Stunned, Jackson fired Duane. 
Even before these events, Jackson had fired his Attorney 
General, John M. Berrien, for refusing to assist him in his war 
on the Bank.  At that time, Jackson had replaced Berrien with 
a more malleable lawyer—a clever man whom he knew to 
share his enmity to the Bank.  Jackson now felt certain that 
this new man would cooperate in ordering the federal deposits 
removed.  He therefore shifted this new man from the Attorney 
General post and, as a recess appointment, named him 
Secretary of the Treasury.  This obedient executor of fiscal 
disaster, this “pliant instrument,”70 this “supple cringing tool of 
Jacksonian power,”71 was none other than Roger Brooke 
Taney.72 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. This was Daniel Webster’s barb in the Senate debate on Taney’s 
nomination to the Court.  See SIMON, supra note 3, at 25.  
 71. NEWMYER, supra note 3.  
 72. In 1834, Chief Justice Taney’s recess appointment as Secretary of the 
Treasury was rejected by the Senate in a vote of eighteen to twenty-eight.  This 
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As Jackson’s Attorney General, Taney had argued long and 
hard for this economic stupidity.  Taney fully shared Jackson’s 
populist suspicion of banks and banking,73 and, in particular, of 
the Bank of the United States.  It was Attorney General Taney 
who had penned the message that Jackson sent to Congress 
with his veto of the bill that would have renewed the Bank’s 
charter.  (In the crash that would soon fall upon the nation, 
Jackson’s “specie circular,” requiring payment in specie for 
federal lands, would make hard money even harder to come 
by.74)  In 1835, Jackson tried to reward Taney for his complicity 
in the collapse of the national credit with a nomination to the 
Supreme Court.  But in the midst of the depression then 
beginning to engulf the country (it would culminate in the 
Panic of 1837),75 the Whig Senate’s mood was one of outrage.  It 
was said that Taney’s role in removing the federal deposits 
from the Bank would “damn him to everlasting fame.”76  The 
Senate rejected Taney’s nomination to the Court on a motion 
for indefinite postponement. 
 
was the first cabinet nomination to be rejected by the Senate. 
 73.  This is a view many readers may share, recalling the global economic 
collapse of 2008, which has been attributable in large part to improvident 
banking.  In fact, banks take the lion’s share of blame in the long history of 
recurrent “panics” in the United States.  See supra note 47. 
 74.  The measure was intended in part to ameliorate Jackson’s “pet 
banks’” failure to invest the federal moneys conservatively.  Instead, the 
recipient banks had gone on a speculative binge, contributing to the economic 
chaos.  See Tony D’Urso, Specie Circular, at http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/ 
essays/1801-1900/andrew-jackson-and-the-bankwar/specie-circular.php 
(accessed April 17, 2017). 
 75.  See Martin A. Armstrong, The Panic of 1837, Princeton Economic 
Institute, at https://www.armstrongeconomics.com/panic-of-1837/ (accessed 
April 17, 2017).  
 76.  “The papers contain a report that the President has appointed Roger 
B. Taney Chief Justice of the United States in the place of the lamented John 
Marshall.  Mr. [Taney’s] . . . slavish devotion to General Jackson . . . led him 
during his short career as Secretary of the Treasury to perform an act of 
subserviency which must ‘damn him to everlasting fame’ . . . .”  PHILIP HONE, 
THE DIARY OF PHILIP HONE, 1828-1851, 148-149 (Bayard Tuckerman ed. 
1889).  
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Then, on July 6, 1835, John Marshall—the great Chief 
Justice, the last of the Federalist generation of Founders, the 
father of American constitutionalism77—let go of life.  
Fatefully, the power of nominating a Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States fell into the hands of 
Andrew Jackson.  And there stood Joseph Story, the obvious 
choice, one of the great Justices and a great authority.78  But 
Andrew Jackson would not bestow the greatest gift in his 
fading patronage upon the author of Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee.79  The Court in that case had simply nailed down an 
established tradition of Supreme Court review of state 
judgments raising federal questions, one rather obviously 
required by the Supremacy Clause and Article III.  However, in 
doing so, the Hunter’s Lessee Court had crammed down state 
throats forever (from the states’ rights point of view) the 
overweening power of the Supreme Court of the United States 
over the states’ own high courts.  But if not Story, who?  Roger 
Brooke Taney had been rejected for an Associate’s seat on the 
Court.  Was there a chance now, for this even greater prize? 
Jackson bided his time and awaited the results of the 
election of 1836.  This bet paid off.  The Whigs were routed.  It 
was the Democrats who would now dominate the Senate.80  In 
his last days in the Presidency, while the country awaited the 
inauguration of Jackson’s hand-picked successor, Martin Van 
Buren, Jackson re-nominated Taney, this time for the Chief 
Justiceship.  In the new Democratic Senate, the nomination 
was approved, notwithstanding Taney’s supposed damnation to 
everlasting infamy.  But even this Jacksonian Senate was 
 
 77.  John Marshall’s greatness requires no defenders, but for a thorough 
refutation of the latter-day revisionism that would dishonor his achievement 
in Marbury v. Madison, see Weinberg, Our Marbury, supra note 41, at 1235-
312. 
 78.  Among his other accomplishments, Justice Story was first Dane 
Professor of Law at Harvard University, and the author of JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1833). 
 79.  Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 304 (1816) (holding 
that the clear tenor of the Constitution, articles III and VI, requires Supreme 
Court review of federal questions decided in the state courts). 
 80.  See John Floyd, The Election of 1836, at http://www.u-s-
history.com/pages/h350.html (accessed April 17  2017).  
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unenthusiastic, and the strenuous opposition of Daniel Webster 
was not without effect.  It was by a sorry vote of twenty-nine to 
fifteen that the Senate confirmed Roger Brooke Taney as Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
For those who had argued before Chief Justice Marshall, 
the apparition of Chief Justice Taney on the bench seems to 
have occasioned even a physical shock.  “It was seeing Roger 
Taney in John Marshall’s chair, however, that chilled. . . .  [He 
was] stooped, sallow, ugly. . . .”81  For all that, the dour 
Marylander is sometimes said to have established a certain 
collegiality among the Justices.82  Alas, the supposed 
collegiality was exposed as very brittle indeed, if it had ever 
existed, when Chief Justice Taney—evidently unwilling to 
permit the brethren to respond to his arguments in Dred 
Scott—shamefully refused to let the Justices see the finished 
opinion prior to publication.83 
 
4. Common Ways of Reading Luther 
The 1849 case of Luther v. Borden84 is among the more 
remembered of the few Taney Court cases in which Chief 
Justice Taney himself took pen in hand to author an opinion for 
the Court.  What was Luther about?  One thing Luther was not 
about was a wrongful arrest—although that was the way the 
case was framed.85  In the Supreme Court, as in the Circuit 
Court below,86 the salient facts were argued as posing the 
 
 81.  NEWMYER, supra note 3, at 93. 
 82.  DEL DICKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE 
PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 43 
(2001). 
 83.  See CURTIS, supra note 21, at 220.  There was a cherished tradition in 
Marshall Court days:  the brethren stayed together at the same boarding 
house in Washington, D.C.  After hours, John Marshall presided over an easy 
and jocular camaraderie.  But that tradition soon gave way in the Taney 
Court, and the Justices, less happy, apparently, to join in frivolities hosted by 
the humorless Chief, took scattered accommodations elsewhere. 
 84.  48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (Taney, C.J.). 
 85.  The original suit was brought in trespass.  Luther, 48 U.S., at 2.  On 
this and other questionable features of the case see infra Part 6. 
 86.  See TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD (reprint ed. 2011), at 23; Luther, 48 U.S. 
(7 How.) at 57 (the Luther plaintiff arguing that the election under the Dorr 
Constitution yielded the true government of Rhode Island).  The page 
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question: Which of two elected state governments is the 
legitimate state government?87  The Circuit Court refused to 
rule on such a question, holding that the Charter government 
was in full force and effect throughout the ineffective rebellion.  
But Chief Justice Taney’s opinion for the Luther Court seized 
on this two-government argument as the question for decision, 
and then held that this question for decision (which of the two 
was the legitimate state government of Rhode Island) was a 
political question.88  Taney correctly defined a political question 
as one confided to the political branches, and therefore beyond 
the power of courts to decide.89  Justice Woodbury, dissenting, 
agreed with Taney about this.90 
Given this ruling of non-justiciability, it might therefore be 
said, in disparagement of Luther’s importance, that all the 
Court did in Luther was decide not to decide.  But, for better or 
worse, Luther is still law today on an array of issues. 
  
 
numbers are as they appear in the 2011 edition.  Handwritten page numbers 
are also included, apparently encompassing a photographed replica of the 
original transcripts. 
 87.  Luther, 48 U.S., at 3.  Cf. Brett W. King, Wild Political Dreaming: 
Historical Context, Popular Sovereignty, and Supermajority Rules, 2 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 609, 646 (2000) (seeing Luther conventionally as a dispute over “the 
legitimacy of competing state governments”). 
 88.  Luther, 48 U.S., at 39 (“[T]he inquiry proposed to be made belong[s] to 
the political power and not to the judicial . . . .”).  
 89.  Id.  A recent article takes the counter-intuitive position that the 
political- question doctrine, far from impeding judicial review, functions as a 
bastion of judicial supremacy, since the courts have the power of choosing 
which cases to review.  See generally Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of 
the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908 (2015). 
 90.  Luther, 48 U.S., at 58-59 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Woodbury stated:  
   Starting, then, as we are forced to here, with several political 
questions arising on this record, and those settled by political 
tribunals in the State and general government, and whose 
decisions on them we possess no constitutional authority to revise, 
all which, apparently, is left for us to decide is the other point—
whether the statute establishing martial law over the whole State, 
and under which the acts done by the defendants are sought to be 
justified, can be deemed constitutional. 
Id.  
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To begin with, lawyers commonly read Luther v. Borden as 
posing the question whether the legitimacy of a state 
government may be challenged under the Constitution’s 
guarantee to each state of a republican form of government.91  
And the answer is “No.” 
A further conventional reading is that the legitimacy of a 
state government is non-justiciable because that issue 
comprises a “political question”—that is, one confided to the 
political branches of government.92 
A third reading emerges from the fact that Chief Justice 
Taney forged boldly ahead on his political question point, 
setting it down that only Congress can determine the 
legitimacy of a state government.93 According to Taney, 
Congress decides whether or not a state government is 
legitimate when it decides whether or not to seat or exclude a 
newly elected member.94  This assertion seems questionable. 
 
 91.  “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against 
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the 
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”  U.S. CONST. art. 
IV, § 4. 
 92.  This now standard reading was also the view of the Circuit Court 
below: 
The question which of the two opposing governments was the 
legitimate one, viz. the charter government, or the government 
established by the voluntary convention, has not heretofore been 
regarded as a judicial one in any of the State courts. The political 
department has always determined whether a proposed 
constitution or amendment was ratified or not by the people of the 
State, and the judicial power has followed its decision.  
TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, supra note 86, at 23.  The plaintiff argued that the 
election under the Dorr Constitution yielded the true government of Rhode 
Island.  Id. at 1.  This apparently appears as a summary certified by Joseph 
Story.  Id. at 19. 
 93.  Id. at 42.  Interestingly, the question in the court below is earlier 
described as one customarily held to be confided to the “people” of the state, 
without specific reference to the political departments of nation or state.  Id. 
at 2. 
 94.  Id. at 42.  The Circuit Court stated: 
And when the senators and representatives of a State are admitted 
into the councils of the Union, the authority of the government 
under which they are appointed, as well as its republican 
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Here is the Guarantee Clause in its entirety: 
The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall 
protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application 
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the 
Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic 
Violence.95 
As you see, the Guarantee Clause contains the nation’s 
guarantee to the states of a republican form of government, but 
does not mention a role for Congress in making good on the 
guarantee.  Moreover, a further clause of section 4, the 
Violence Clause, inferentially places responsibility on the 
President, in cases of “domestic violence” or “invasion,” to 
enforce the nation’s guarantee to the states of a republican 
form of government.  In addition, the Guarantee Clause 
provides that the governor or legislature of a state can request 
the assistance of the nation in cases of domestic violence.  (In 
cases of invasion the nation can act on its own.) 
 Implicit in all this is the fact that it is only the President, 
in the end, who can make good on the nation’s guarantee.  As 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces, it is the President 
who can order forces into a state to protect that state from 
domestic “violence” or “invasion.”96  In discussing the power of 
the President in this context, Chief Justice Taney is able to 
ignore these facts because he breaks the Guarantee Clause in 
two, treating the Violence Clause separately.  It is the bare 
guarantee, shorn of the Violence Clause, that is exclusively 
confided to Congress, according to Taney. 
 
character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority. And 
its decision is binding on every other department of the 
government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal. 
Id. 
 95.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 96.  See Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 
114 YALE L.J. 149, 170 (2004) (discussing national emergency powers in the 
context of Luther v. Borden). 
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There are at least two further views of Luther.  In a fourth 
view, Luther is read more broadly.  Because Luther arose in the 
wake of two competing gubernatorial elections, after Luther 
there arose a feeling in the profession that challenges to any 
election, federal or state, at any stage of the electoral process 
(on any theory) might be non-justiciable.97  This vague 
suspicion coexisted, however, with a long tradition in this 
country of challenges to the electoral process at every stage, 
and Luther, in all likelihood, has had no meaningful bearing on 
such challenges, which continue unabated.98 
Even more broadly, Luther is read in yet a fifth way, to 
have deleted the Guarantee Clause from the Constitution 
altogether, as far as judicial review is concerned.99  
Interestingly, David Currie thought Luther could have no 
bearing on the Guarantee Clause, remarking that the 
Guarantee Clause was a “gratuitous” interjection into Luther 
by Chief Justice Taney.100  Professor Currie may have viewed 
as insufficient the uses of the Clause in the briefs and 
arguments of the parties, but the Guarantee Clause, in terms, 
does appear in two of the arguments of record.101  Indeed, it 
might well be considered a measure of the non-justiciability of 
the Clause that, in Luther, both parties relied on it.  It is true, 
 
  97.  As late as 2016, the argument was raised in State v. Berger, 781 
S.E.2d 248 (N.C. 2016).  But see Whitford v. Nichol, 151 F.Supp. 3d 918 (W.D. 
Wis. 2015) (rejecting the argument).  This is the theory of the case that 
concerned Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).  See 
discussion infra Part 11. 
 98.  For discussion of this phenomenon, see Louise Weinberg, When Courts 
Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 
646-56 (2002).  There is an American saying that an election is never over, 
and in the shadow of allegations of Russian interference in the recent 
presidential election, the proverb may have some truth in it for the 
immediate future.  See, e.g., “Trump and Russia: Never-ending story,” THE 
ECONOMIST (April 1st-7th 2017), at 23.  
 99.  See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in 
Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Theory That Self-
Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1324 (2005) (in 
a broad critique of justiciability doctrines, taking Luther as rendering the 
Guarantee Clause non-justiciable). 
 100.  David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Article IV 
and Federal Powers, 1836-1864, 1983 DUKE L.J. 695, 718-19 (1983). 
 101.  Cf. Luther, 48 U.S., at 4, 26, 32.  
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however, that, after the Civil War, courts often reached the 
merits in cases raising the Guarantee Clause as an obstacle.102 
That the Guarantee Clause is considered non-justiciable 
today is traceable, not so much to Luther, as to the 1912 Pacific 
States Telephone case, which, with extensive quotations from 
Luther, revived it and doubled down on it.103  The sense of 
Pacific Telephone is that the Guarantee Clause itself renders 
any issue depending upon it altogether non-justiciable, and 
thus, that the Guarantee Clause can never be a source of 
individual right.104 
That conclusion is what is most disturbing about these 
various readings of Luther.105  In the last resort, it has to be the 
counter-majoritarian obligation of courts in well-governed 
countries to protect minorities and the rights of individuals.  A 
proscription of judicial review on any theory will diminish the 
rule of law, as it is understood in the Anglo-American tradition. 
Chief Justice Marshall, in our greatest case, Marbury v. 
Madison,106 first identified the phenomenon of “[q]uestions, in 
their nature political.”107  Marshall was explicit that a violation 
of individual right can never present a political question.  While 
acknowledging that courts should not meddle in government 
policy, Chief Justice Marshall nevertheless was adamant that 
 
 102.  On post-bellum cases in the Supreme Court alone, see  Minor v. 
Happersett,  88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (voting rights of women; The Ku 
Klux Cases (ex parte Yarbrough), 110 U.S. 651 (1874) (intimidation of voters 
at the polls); Dubuclet v. State of La., 103 U.S. 550 (1880 ) (Board of Elections 
illegally changing results); Ex parte Warmouth , 84 U.S. 64 (1872) 
(supervisors instructed to block certain votes illegally).  But see infra note 142 
and accompanying text.  For redistricting cases, see infra note 162. 
 103.  Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (holding 
that a tax authorized by referendum could not be challenged under the 
Guarantee Clause on the ground that the referendum process is inconsistent 
with a republican form of government).  For a discussion of the problems 
presented by Pacific States, see Andrew C. Noll, Note, A Reversal of Pacific 
States in Article III Garb, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 639 (2015). 
 104.  Pacific States, 223 U.S.,. at 151. 
 105.  Cf. Note, Political Rights as Political Questions: The Paradox of 
Luther v. Borden, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1125 (1987) (observing the disconnect 
between the aspirations of the unjustly disenfranchised and a “political 
questions” doctrine that would bar them from a day in court). 
 106.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 107.  Id. at 163. 
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an injured individual’s complaint of government wrongdoing—
as opposed to a general challenge to government policy—is 
always justiciable.108  Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged 
that “[q]uestions, in their nature political, or which are, by the 
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be 
made in this court,”109 and that courts were “not to enquire how 
the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which 
they have a discretion.”  Nevertheless, Marshall was clear that 
courts exist “solely, to decide on the rights of individuals. . . .”110  
In this spirit, Marshall had the courage to declare, to President 
Jefferson’s lasting resentment, that a government official 
cannot “sport away the vested rights of others,”111 and to rule 
that Marbury’s claim was a good claim.112  In other words, 
although the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction over it, 
Marbury’s claim would be good in any court that did. 
Thus, although Article IV logically accords the President a 
certain discretion to enforce the national guarantee to each 
state of a republican form of government, if the President 
exercises this discretion in a manner that deprives an 
individual of some right, it should be a matter of course that 
courts can, and should, assert jurisdiction to vindicate that 
right, anything in Luther to the contrary notwithstanding. 
At a deeper level, after a closer look at the case, I will offer 
some disturbing fresh perspectives on Luther. 
 
 
 108.  Id. at 166.  See Louise Weinberg, Political Questions and the 
Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L REV. 887 (1994). 
 109.  Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. 
 110.  Id. at 169-170.  For discussion of this class of problems, see for 
example Grove, The Lost History, supra note 89 (arguing, correctly, that 
constitutional questions, historically, were never political questions). 
 111.  Marbury, 5 U.S., at 166. 
 112.  Id. at 162.  As late as 1823, Jefferson was inveighing against Chief 
Justice Marshall’s 1803 holding that Marbury’s claim was a good claim: 
“This practice of Judge Marshall, of traveling out of his case to 
prescribe what the law would be in a moot case not before the 
court, is very irregular and very censurable. . . . [T]he Chief Justice 
went on to lay down what the law would be, had they jurisdiction 
of the case . . . . [C]ould anything exceed [this] perversion of law?” 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge William Johnson (June 12, 1823), 
reprinted in 1 S.C. HIST. & GENEALOGICAL MAG. 3, 9 (1900). 
28https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/8
 728 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2 
 
5. A Crisis in Rhode Island113 
The following account of this oft-told tale is drawn from 
copious sources.114  Those who have had occasion to read a 
discussion of Luther, or the case itself, will recall that Luther 
arose out of the Dorr rebellion in Rhode Island.  Rhode Island’s 
original colonial Charter, containing no provision for 
amendment,115 had assigned the shaping of the colony’s 
suffrage to the Charter’s original grantees.  The grantees, 
exercising this delegated power, had decreed that the right to 
vote should be extended to all adult white male owners of land 
to a then-substantial value of $134.00.116 
This qualification for the suffrage—significant property in 
land—was not uncommon in the colonies, and persisted into 
the early Republic.  In the early antebellum period, land 
ownership was a qualification for the vote in Great Britain as 
well.  In colonial America, the voter with property in land was 
 
 113.  Rhode Island was still a slave state de facto at the time of the 
governance crisis seen in Luther.  Although Rhode Island had formally 
abolished slavery in 1774, the state had found it convenient to institute a 
gradual emancipation plan; emancipation was not completed until 1843, with 
the adoption of a new constitution that eliminated slavery’s remaining traces. 
Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1971 (1990), at n. 84.  
Rhode Island adopted a constitution in 1843 eliminating the last traces of 
slavery.  Id.  For a detailed treatment, see CHRISTY MIKEL CLARK-PUJARA, 
SLAVERY, EMANCIPATION AND BLACK FREEDOM IN RHODE ISLAND, 1652-1842 
(2009) (dissertation available at Iowa Research Online, http://ir.uiowa.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4956&context=etd). 
 114.  See ERIK J. CHAPUT, THE PEOPLE’S MARTYR: THOMAS WILSON DORR 
AND HIS 1842 RHODE ISLAND REBELLION (2014); RORY RAVEN, THE DORR WAR: 
TREASON, REBELLION AND THE FIGHT FOR REFORM IN RHODE ISLAND (2010); 
RUSSELL J. DESIMONE & DANIEL C. SCHOFIELD, BROADSIDES OF THE DORR 
REBELLION (1992); PATRICK T. CONLEY, THE DORR REBELLION: RHODE ISLAND’S 
CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT (1976); MARVIN E GETTLEMAN, THE 
DORR REBELLION: A STUDY IN AMERICAN RADICALISM, 1833-1849 (1973); 
William L. R. Gifford, The Dorr Rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842, in 4 THE 
NEW PRINCETON REVIEW 213-26 (1887); see also TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, 
supra note 86. 
 115.  Luther, 45 U.S., at 36. 
 116.  Peter J. Comerford, Stoddard v. Martin: A Rhode Island Tale, 62 R.I. 
B.J. 13 (Apr. 2014); See William M.  Wiecek, “Slavery and Abolition Before 
the United States Supreme Court,” in ABOLITIONISM AND AMERICAN LAW 134-
40 (John R. McKivigan ed. 1999). 
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trusted as a responsible man with a stake in the governance of 
his colony.  Landowners retained this position of privilege in 
the successor States as a matter of course. 
Legislators, obviously, are not eager to legislate against 
the form of suffrage under which they were elected, and Rhode 
Island’s property requirement endured.  It could not have 
helped matters that Rhode Island also lacked a written 
constitution.  Its successive legislative assemblies operated 
under its original royal charter, and entrenched themselves by 
maintaining the suffrage as it had existed under that 
document.  But by 1840, Rhode Island was substantially urban, 
and most adult white males in Rhode Island were then non-
landowning residents of its towns.  These included members of 
the learned professions, wealthy merchants, bankers, and other 
educated citizens.  Few of these had a right to vote.  On the 
other hand, few rural Rhode Islanders had $134 worth of 
property in land.  The upshot was that only relatively wealthy 
country people had the vote.  The suffrage produced and 
perpetuated an elite rural class.  This effect was enhanced by a 
provision in the original Rhode Island Charter mandating 
equal representation in the state General Assembly for all 
towns, however small.  Thus, a plantation had only to 
incorporate as a town to gain representation equal to that of a 
bustling port city. 
Most states, by 1840, under pressure from moneyed urban 
interests, had disembarrassed their election laws of property 
requirements.  But Rhode Island clung to the suffrage under its 
original Charter, with increasing entrenchment of a ruling 
rural elite.  By 1840, some sixty percent of adult white males in 
Rhode Island were disenfranchised.  This and the following 
account is taken variously from the above-cited authors.117  
  Thomas Dorr was a young Providence lawyer of good 
family.  He had been educated at Exeter and Harvard, and had 
read law with Chancellor Kent.  He was elected a member of 
the Rhode Island General Assembly.  This brought home to him 
the peculiar fact that neither he nor his well-off merchant 
father had the right to vote in Rhode Island.  Dorr decided, 
 
 117.  See also Weinberg, Political Questions, supra note 108. 
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under his own authority, to call a constitutional convention.118  
Rich men and others excluded from the Charter suffrage, and 
members of the Assembly who agreed with them or sought to 
please them, came together in Newport119 at this convention, 
and worked up a putative constitution for Rhode Island,120 the 
important feature of which, as far as the Dorrites were 
concerned, was that it provided universal adult white male 
suffrage. 
Rhode Island’s existing state legislature, stirred to action, 
attempted to produce an authoritative alternative constitution.  
But this latter effort did not extend the suffrage as generously 
as the Dorr constitution did, and the Dorrites in the legislature 
helped to defeat it.  The Dorrites then held a referendum on 
their own new constitution, a referendum in which all adult 
white males were welcome to vote, and the Dorr constitution 
was approved in a landslide.121 
Push came to shove when, in 1842, the Dorrite and 
Charterite factions each conducted its own election for 
governor.  Dorr was elected in the Dorrite election, but those 
voting under the old Charter reëlected the incumbent governor, 
Samuel W. King.  King refused to yield to Dorr.122  He would 
not give Dorr entry to the governor’s offices.  Crowds of 
Dorrites assembled to protest and to listen to angry 
speeches.123  At Governor King’s instance, the Rhode Island 
legislature, fearing violence, made a formal request to 
President John Tyler for federal troops.  As we have already 
reminded ourselves, the Guarantee Clause itself provides for 
 
 118.  TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, supra note 86, at 72. 
 119.  Id. at 69. 
 120.  Id. at 84. 
 121.  Id. at 103.  There were also Dorrite elections to scores of offices, and 
legislation enacted by a Dorrite legislature. TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, supra 
note 86, at 112-21.  The Dorrites also sought transfer of records and prepared 
to reorganize the militia.  Id. at 124-25. 
 122.  For a curious replication of the two-governor facts of Luther, see 
Baxter v. Brooks, 29 Ark. 173 (1874).  The Arkansas high court relied on 
Luther, but was happy to interpret the Violence Clause of Article IV, Section 
4, in its bearing on the Guarantee Clause.  Thus, the Arkansas judges more 
realistically assigned to the President, rather than Congress, the power over 
the political question presented. 
 123.  TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, supra note 86, at 5. 
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this procedure: 
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and 
shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on 
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive 
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against 
domestic Violence.”124 
President Tyler responded to this request by taking the 
line that he had better wait until violence was more clearly 
threatened.125 
The Dorrites then made a disastrous mistake—an 
incomprehensible one, seeing that legitimacy must always have 
been a primary concern with them.  They took to the streets, 
going so far as to launch a futile assault on an arsenal in 
Providence.  Governor King proclaimed martial law on June 25, 
1842,126 and the leaders of the rebellion were arrested.127  Dorr 
went into hiding, and the rebellion fizzled out.  It was all over 
in “two days,” as Henry Webster remarked with some 
exaggeration in oral argument of the case before the Supreme 
Court.128  In fact, it was “all over” by June 24th, 1842.129 
Other states had quite peaceably handled the problem of 
outmoded suffrage; constitutional conventions had approved 
new state constitutions providing for universal adult white 
male suffrage and omitted property qualifications.130  In 
elections under these new constitutions, new governments had 
been elected and taken office without encountering difficulties.  
Educated urban classes became part of the electorate.  In this 
perspective, Rhode Island’s experience was needlessly 
turbulent. 
 
 124.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 125.  Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 33 (1849); Conron, Law, 
Politics, supra note 87, at 380 (pointing out that by the time the Supreme 
Court confronted the issue, it was purely “academic”). 
 126.  Id. at 8, 15-16. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Luther, 48 U.S., at 34. 
 129.  TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, supra note 86, at 5. 
 130.  See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 1 (1821) (eliminating property 
qualifications for white voters). 
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6.  The Framing of Luther 
The framing of the case that became Luther v. Borden has 
created difficulties for commentators.  They understand the 
trespass claim, correctly, as a failed attempt to raise the issue 
of unfair suffrage in Rhode Island.  But that leaves 
unexplained other peculiarities of the case.  It is possible that 
the original framing of Luther also might have been an effort to 
establish that the Dorrites’ case, in essence about unfair 
suffrage, was one of individual right, and not merely “a public 
action.”  But the Dorrites wound up pleading a case about one 
thing as about something else, obscuring the actual issue—
unfair suffrage—by pleading a concocted tort:  a trespassory 
arrest.131  This would have made it difficult for them to 
introduce evidence about a serious abridgment of voting rights. 
A practical further problem for the Dorrites seems to have 
been that Dorr himself was evidently in custody in Rhode 
Island at the time the action was brought.  The litigation had 
to be brought not by Dorr himself, but by a Dorrite couple, 
Martin and Rachel Luther.132  Federal diversity jurisdiction 
was also essential to the Dorrites; there was no federal-
question jurisdiction at the time.  But even had federal-
question jurisdiction been in existence, the Dorrites’ case, as 
framed, alas, did not arise under federal law.  Their federal 
question could reach the Supreme Court, but in the Circuit 
Court below it could appear only as a reply to a defense.  Yet, 
obviously, they would not have wanted to try their case in a 
state court.  So, since the allegedly trespassing arresting officer 
had to be a citizen of Rhode Island if the pleading of 
unauthorized arrest made any sense, the plaintiff Dorrites had 
 
 131.  After 1875, following the party-of-record rule of Osborn v. Bank, 22 
U.S. 738, 819 (1824), it was thought necessary, in trying to gain access to a 
federal injunction against unconstitutional state action, to plead some 
trespassory conduct on the part of the defendant official.  See id.  This fiction 
was rendered unnecessary after Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 160 (1908), 
which held, inter alia, that a federal injunction could issue to block a 
violation of the Constitution directly, without the necessity of pleading a 
state-law trespass as well).  See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S., at 123, supra note 
133. 
 132.  Luther, 48 U.S., at 1; TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, supra note 86, at 2. 
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to have conveniently moved to Massachusetts after the arrest.  
So jurisdiction as well as the tort scenario was manufactured.  
Defense counsel used the term, “pretended.”133 
And there was more to the pretense than this.  Luther 
came to the federal Circuit Court sitting in Providence in an 
action for damages against a “master mariner” who, 
nevertheless, was also alleged to be a Charterite officer who 
lacked authority to arrest the plaintiff.134  The complaint 
alleged that the arresting person, without legitimate 
governmental authority, had trespassed upon the plaintiff’s 
home, breaking and entering it to arrest him, and “ill-treating 
his family” as well.135 
So, it came about that the great question of the 
constitutionality of the Charterite election in Rhode Island was 
not raised in some direct challenge to the suffrage under the 
old charter. 
The defendant, anticipating the constitutional question, 
thought to punt by defending on the ground, not that the King 
government was legitimate, but rather that he, the arresting 
officer, was, indeed, authorized.  This the defendant undertook, 
with copious documents and testimony as to the need for, and 
existence of, martial law, under which authorization the 
defendant militia men were deputed to arrest the plaintiffs.  
This defense nevertheless did indeed open the case to the reply 
that the officer, though “authorized,” was not properly 
authorized, because the Charter government was not a 
legitimate government.  So it was that the legitimacy vel non of 
Rhode Island’s suffrage would enter the case only circuitously, 
 
 133.  See TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, supra note 86, at 10, characterizing the 
alleged trespasses as “pretended.  On the other hand, it is not surprising, in 
the port city of Providence Plantations, that several of the arresting men, 
apparently citizen deputees, should be listed as mariners, and Luther M. 
Borden, the alphabetically first named defendant, is described as a “master 
mariner.”. 
 134.  Id. at 10. 
 135.  Id. at 3.  The pretended diversity, the concocted arrest, the reliance 
on raising the issue in chief as a reply to a defense, the whole set of 
improbable scenarios, has been termed by one writer a veritable “Monty 
Python sketch.”  See HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND 209 
(1994). 
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/8
 734 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 37:2 
and almost speculatively. 
What should the Dorrites have done?  In retrospect, we can 
say that an individual voter, having conveniently moved out of 
state, might have brought a direct challenge to Rhode Island’s 
suffrage law, in a suit in equity.  Copious salient evidence was 
indeed adduced revealing the history and nature of Rhode 
Island’s suffrage, and the extent of its unfairness.136  An action 
at law should have been understood to be unhelpful, and the 
case should not have gone to a jury.137  Injunctive relief should 
have been sought.  Instead of the militia officers joined as 
defendants in the actual suit, the Dorrites should have joined 
state electoral officials competent to halt enforcement  of Rhode 
Island’s property qualification, at the point of registration, or 
even at the polling places. 138 
Chief Justice Taney himself had once stressed the 
necessity for this typical sort of “officer suit” in equity cases 
challenging some state act or law.  In his well-known opinion in 
the Charles River Bridge case, Taney had stated, “But this 
court can make no decree which can relieve the complainants, 
 
 136.  TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, 66-105. 
 137.  Cf. TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, supra note 86, “Case No. 115,” orig. p. 
189.  See Howard’s report, Luther, at 1, stating that this case was brought to 
the Court on a difference of opinion, some of the Justices having felt that the 
case should not have gone to the jury.  I take this to mean that the Justices 
perceived that, if properly brought as a challenge to Rhode Island’s suffrage, 
the case would have been in equity.  The “difference of opinion,” like today’s 
certification of a question to a higher court, was provided for in the First 
Judiciary Act, Section 19, on the assumption of a suit in equity. 
 138.  Chief Justice Taney himself had pointed out the necessity for such 
joinder in equity cases.  He stated.  
Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to 
decide what government is the established one in a State.  For as 
the United States guarantee to each State a republican 
government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is 
established in the State before it can determine whether it is 
republican or not. And when the senators and representatives of a 
State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of 
the government under which they are appointed, as well as its 
republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional 
authority.  And its decision is binding on every other department of 
the government, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.   
Charles River Bridge, 37 U.S. at 462. 
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because there are no parties before it capable of obeying an 
injunction.”139  After all, equity acts in personam, on threat of 
contempt.  In any injunction suit brought by a Dorrite voter, 
key legislators and responsible electoral officials should have 
been joined.  So also the very registrar who turned away the 
plaintiff voter, to provide a sense of standing and help to 
differentiate a private bill from a public action. 
Even with this, our hypothetical bill in equity was unlikely 
to succeed in the Taney Court (for reasons which, however 
obvious at this point in our discussion, will become even clearer 
as we proceed).  Nor were later Courts much better.  After the 
turn of the century, the Fuller Court would be confronted with 
Giles v. Harris (1903),140 a suit challenging discriminatory 
administration of a state’s suffrage.  The registrar in Giles’ 
district would not enter Giles’ name on the rolls because Giles 
was black.  The Court, by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, held 
that Giles’ case must be dismissed—on the inexcusable ground 
that relief in a case of “great political wrong”141 was beyond the 
powers of a court sitting in equity.  I say, “inexcusable” because 
we know that the powers of a federal court sitting in equity are 
much greater than Holmes imagined,142 and were so even in 
Holmes’ day.143  Had Luther gone the other way it would have 
furnished the major precedent that would have saved the Giles 
Court from the opprobrium of history. 
 
 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). 
 141.  Id. at 487. 
 142.  See Louise Weinberg, Holmes’ Failure¸ 96 MICH. L. REV. 691, 695. 
722-23 (1997) (concluding that Holmes’ intellect was so bound up with the 
common law and its myriad clever defenses that he failed to see the triumph 
of equity even as it was in his day.). 
 143.  See equity cases reviewed in extenso in ex parte Young; 209 U.S. 123 
(1908) (discussing antebellum and post-bellum injunction suits against state 
officials). 
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7.  Reading Luther Narrowly:  Political Questions 
Luther’s broad holding —that courts may not enforce the 
Guarantee Clause of Article IV of the Constitution of the 
United States—is troubling to those who tend to fear judicial 
erasure of any part of the Constitution.  The amendment 
process is prescribed for such a purpose.  Yet Luther held that, 
in courts, the Guarantee Clause is self-annihilating because, 
while offering no judicial remedy, it triggers a judicial 
defense—a blanket defense that defeats the Guarantee Clause 
in all cases.  This means, for example, that a state may be 
oppressed by a tyrant governor who prorogues its legislature 
and governs by decree, but the tyrant governor cannot be made 
to defend his tyrannical powers in court—at least, not under 
the Guarantee Clause. 
Reading the case narrowly, however, we might see Chief 
Justice Taney as holding in Luther that, however useful the 
Guarantee Clause might be in other cases, it could not be used 
to decide the “political question” of the legitimacy of a state 
government.  We should pause to consider that question in its 
own terms, which are remarkable.  What else is the Guarantee 
Clause for?144 
That a state government is republican in form, Chief 
Justice Taney would assure us, is guaranteed exclusively by 
Congress.145  (In cases of violence, Taney had to acknowledge—
at great length—that the guarantee also becomes the business 
of the President.)146  But the guarantee, for Chief Justice 
Taney, was quite separate from its enforcement. 
  
 
 144.  See, e.g., Jonathan Toren, Note, Protecting Republican Government 
from Itself: The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
LIBERTY 371 (2007). 
 145.  Luther, 48 U.S., at 42. 
 146.  Id. at 43. 
37
 2017 LUTHER V. BORDEN: MYSTERY SOLVED  737 
According to Taney, insofar as the legitimacy of a state 
government is in question, that is a political question, 
exclusively for Congress.  It is the Constitution itself that 
confides this question to Congress.  Congress’s exclusive role is 
to be found, not in the Guarantee Clause, but in Article I.  
Under Article I, Section 5, “Each House shall be the Judge of 
the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own 
Members.”147 
In Taney’s view, the constitutional guarantee of a 
republican form of state government is effectuated solely when 
Congress is considering debarring a member from taking his 
seat.  At that moment Congress determines whether the newly-
elected member is a representative of a state enjoying a 
republican form of government.  This determination is 
necessarily exclusive, discretionary and final.  Thus there can 
be no judicial review of it.148 
Taney’s logic here, insofar as it merges Congress’s power to 
assess the qualifications of a new member with a presumed 
power to determine the republican form of a state’s 
government, is hardly convincing.  The question before 
Congress, whether or not to seat a new member, undoubtedly 
could raise a question about the member’s legitimacy qua 
elected representative, but it is a leap of logic for Chief Justice 
Taney to have concluded that the power to decide whether to 
admit a new member is also a power to decide whether a state 
is legitimate.  One can imagine a scenario in which a member 
is admitted precisely because the state’s had abandoned a 
republican form of government, and the prospective member 
the last representative properly elected.  It is an even larger 
leap of logic to have posited that such a power not only resides 
in Congress, but in Congress exclusively, because Article I 
makes each House the sole judge of the qualifications of its 
members.  However, Article I does not say anything about a 
“sole” power to judge the qualifications of members of either 
house.  Although  in the impeachment clauses of Article I, the 
 
 147.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
 148.  Luther, 48 U.S., at 42-43. 
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framers use the emphatic word, “sole,”149 that word does not 
appear in that Article’s clauses about the power to judge the 
qualifications of members.150 
 
8.  Powell v. McCormack 
This very question, about the justiciability of a decision by 
Congress to exclude a new member, arose, as it happens, some 
120 years after Luther v. Borden, in the interesting case of 
Powell v. McCormack.151  There, Adam Clayton Powell, a 
representative elected in his New York district, was “excluded” 
from Congress.  That is, he was not permitted to take his seat.  
It appears that Powell had with inadequate justification kept 
his first wife on his official payroll.152  But having met the 
Constitution’s requirements for election to the House of 
Representatives, Powell was an elected member of the House of 
Representatives.  Thus, in effect, Powell was expelled on a 
motion to exclude.  Had Congress understood its vote as a 
motion to expel, the vote of the House, it was suggested, might 
have been otherwise.153 
Chief Justice Warren, in what may have been his last 
great opinion for the Court, did not dwell on this apparent 
irregularity.  He held, among other things, that the “political 
questions” doctrine was no bar to adjudication of the legality of 
Powell’s exclusion from the House.  In other words, the House’s 
decision not to seat a member was justiciable. 
 
 149.  Article I, Section 2, provides: “The House of Representatives shall 
chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of 
Impeachment.  Article I, Section 3 provides: “The Senate shall have the sole 
Power to try all Impeachments.” 
 150.  Article I, Section 5, provides: “ “Each House shall be the Judge of the 
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, . . .” 
 151. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
     152. See http://www.greatblackheroes.com/government/adam-clayton-
powell-jr/ (accessed June 18, 2017):  “In 1967, a House committee suspended 
Powell’s third wife, Yvette Diago, and accused her of being on the House 
payroll without doing any work. Diago, in fact, admitted that she had moved 
to Puerto Rico in 1961, but was paid from Powell’s Congressional payroll from 
that time until January of 1967 when the allegation came to light and she 
was fired.” 
 153.  Powell, 395 U.S., at 506-07. 
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Luther v. Borden was not mentioned—either in the Chief 
Justice’s opinion or in Justice Stewart’s dissent.  To be sure, 
the legitimacy of the government of New York State was not an 
issue, nor was the state’s suffrage.  However, Chief Justice 
Warren’s opinion would have worked as well had Powell been—
let us say—a newly-elected senator in Louisiana, in the days 
when Huey Long was still running the state from Washington 
D.C.  In fact, in 1935, President Roosevelt considered a 
national takeover of Louisiana to oppose Long, then Roosevelt’s 
chief rival in political popularity.  The idea was to launch a 
House investigative committee, preparatory to some legal 
attack, under cover of Article IV’s national guarantee to each 
state of a republican form of government.  However, Long’s 
dictatorship during the Great Depression was benign—indeed, 
beneficial.  Under Long, Louisiana developed a distinguished 
university, much-improved infrastructure, employment 
opportunities, and more.154  Roosevelt, ever an astute 
politician, backed off, feeling that Huey Long was too popular 
to take on.  Long would be assassinated that same year.155 
Chief Justice Warren referred to the historical precedent of 
the repeatedly-elected and excluded English parliamentarian, 
John Wilkes.156  Like Adam Clayton Powell, Wilkes also was 
under a cloud.  Repeatedly elected, he was repeatedly denied 
his seat.  Wilkes, a journalist, had criticized King George III.  
After a pornographic essay by Wilkes was read in Parliament, 
Wilkes was expelled.  He fled to France, and became a symbol 
of liberty.  Wilkes’ long struggle to take his seat in Parliament 
made him a hero to Americans.  They named their children 
after him.  Eventually, Parliament yielded and Wilkes was 
seated.  Chief Justice Warren reasoned that, like Wilkes, 
Powell had been elected by his constituency, and, since he, 
Powell, met all Article I requirements of the office, his voters 
had a right to be represented by the person whom they had 
 
 154.  See, e.g., T. HARRY WILLIAMS, HUEY LONG 492-524 (1981). 
 155.  The story is well told in Gerard N. Magliocca, Huey P. Long and the 
Guarantee Clause, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2008).  
 156.  Powell, 395 U.S. at 523, 528-32.  For recent comment on John 
Wilkes’ expulsion from Parliament, see Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. 
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012). 
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elected.157  The Constitution, the Court held, did not make the 
House a judge of a member’s character or past conduct, but 
only of his or her fulfillment of the requirements stated in 
Article I.  As for the Guarantee Clause, it was pleaded in 
Powell, but the Court declined to reach the Clause’s possible 
relevance.158  Instead, the Court confined itself simply to the 
constitutional text and to Wilkes’s precedential struggle. 
What Taney achieved in Luther was a rather tricky 
exercise in sleight of hand.  In effect, taking advantage of the 
strained pleadings, he was able to hypothesize an irrelevant 
and falsely exclusive decision-making scenario to justify his 
refusal to decide the question actually presented,159 whether or 
not the Charterite government of Rhode Island, elected by an 
electorate in which suffrage was denied to sixty percent of 
adult white males, was “a republican form of government.”  
Although it is not clear that a wrongly-arrested person is the 
party plaintiff we would choose, we should think it imperative 
that any individual aggrieved by denial of the right to vote, a 
denial that, under changed circumstances, had become 
arbitrary and irrational, and any class of individuals aggrieved 
by such a thing, should have a right to challenge it in a court of 
law.  Of course, that is what Baker v. Carr would eventually 
hold.160 
 
 
 157.  Powell, 395 U.S. at 550.  Certain voters were joined as plaintiffs in 
Powell’s suit.  The difficulties of the case had to do with the defendant and 
the related remedial difficulties the case presented.  See id. at 567-68 (Powell, 
J., dissenting). 
 158.  Id. at 521 n.41. 
     159. See Michael A. Conron, Law, Politics, and Chief Justice Taney: A 
Reconsideration of the Luther v. Borden Decision, 11 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 377, 
380 (1967) (assuming that the issue for the Court in Luther was to decide 
between two rival governments, but pointing out that, by the time the 
Supreme Court confronted that issue, it was purely “academic”). 
 160.  Baker, 369 U.S. at 186; see infra Part 11. 
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9.  Political Questions and the Guarantee Clause 
 after Luther 
The “political questions” doctrine is a powerful door-closer, 
but it was never intended to close the door to vindication of the 
rights of individuals.  As we have been reminded, Chief Justice 
Marshall created the doctrine in the great case of Marbury v. 
Madison.161  Marshall made plain that deference to the political 
branches, in matters not within their sound discretion, is 
inconsistent with our constitutionalism.  For example, a 
decision by Congress to declare war would be non-justiciable.  
But a decision by a local draft board to punish protesters 
against that war by drafting them, in violation of their right of 
free speech, would be justiciable.  So also would be any 
deprivation of the statutory rights of any draftee.  At bottom, 
deprivations of statutory rights by government, state or 
federal, are deprivations of liberty or property, and are 
violations of due process as well as of statutory rights.162 
It is heartening to all who value the American institution 
of judicial review that, after the Civil War, the Supreme Court 
began to process Guarantee Clause cases on their merits, 
Luther to the contrary notwithstanding.  True, in the post-
bellum cases, government misconduct is typically sustained 
 
 161.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803); see supra 
note 107 and accompanying text.  Were the courts to be guided by Chief 
Justice Marshall, it would be understood that deference to a political branch 
is incompatible with the rule of law when the rights of individuals are justly 
asserted.  Prudential considerations that counsel “deferential” doctrines to 
impede the assertion or vindication of individual rights tend to share features 
of generality and speculativeness, which should unfit them for judicial use.  
Comity, deference, exclusive powers, the “floodgates” argument, canons of 
statutory construction that frustrate the very purposes of a statute—all exist 
at a remove from the particular case.  They defeat just claims and diminish 
the rule of law.  In my view, the sort of general rule that should apply in a 
case of actual violation of individual right is probably of the class of rules of 
which the most prominent member is ubi jus ibi remedium. 
 162.  Cf. Louise Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance: Due Process 
and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1057 (2013) (arguing that 
due process requires that law be chosen rationally, applied rationally, and 
enforced rationally, over and above the requirement that law be rational in 
itself). 
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anyway, as not in breach of the guarantee.163  Substantive 
outcomes are not altered.  This interesting disregard of Chief 
Justice Taney’s reasoning appears as early as the late 
Reconstruction period,164 and may reflect only that federal-
question jurisdiction had become available.  It could also reflect 
a fastidious judicial rejection of the work of the discredited 
author of Dred Scott.  The most constructive resort to the 
Guarantee Clause after Luther, albeit in a case that did not 
involve the suffrage, appears in Justice Harlan’s celebrated 
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.165  Justice Harlan challenged the 
majority’s approval of de jure racial segregation as inconsistent 
with the Guaranty Clause, writing: 
“Slavery, as an institution tolerated by law, [has] 
disappeared from our country; but there [should not] 
remain a power in the states, by sinister legislation, . . . 
to regulate civil rights, common to all citizens, upon the 
basis of race. . . .  Such a system is inconsistent with the 
guaranty given by the constitution to each state of a 
republican form of government. . . .166 
Indeed, by the 1890s, Taney’s reading of the Guarantee 
Clause was more or less in desuetude.  However, in 1912, The 
Supreme Court handed down an opinion amounting to an 
endorsement of the most extreme reading of Luther, rendering 
the Guarantee Clause wholly non-justiciable.  That occurred in 
1912, in the Pacific Telephone case.167  That case was a 
 
 163.  See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of Mich. v. Lowery, 199 U.S. 233 (1905) (state-
level districting of schools); Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900) (state 
legislative panel determining contested elections for the office of governor); 
Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 (1897) (state judiciary setting city 
boundaries); Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449 (1891) (state legislature 
enacting certain criminal statutes); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 
162 (1874) (state retaining exclusively male suffrage). 
 164.  See, e.g., Happersett, 88 U.S., at 162. 
 165.  163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896). 
 166.  Id. at 563-64. 
 167.  Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 143 (1912) (citing 
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)) (broadly holding non-justiciable 
a taxpayer complaint claim under the Guarantee Clause).  See also Colegrove 
v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Guarantee 
Clause presents a non-justiciable political question under Pacific States); 
Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1913) (same holding).  
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challenge, under the Guarantee Clause, to the constitutionality 
of a tax authorized by a voter initiative.168  Citing Luther for 
the proposition that the Guarantee Clause is non-justiciable, 
the Pacific Telephone Court ordered the case dismissed for 
want of “jurisdiction.”169 
 
10.  Luther Without Blinders:  The Suffrage 
There are more disquieting aspects of Luther v. Borden 
than I have thus far touched upon.  Chief Justice Taney 
managed, in Luther, to do a bit of further damage, beyond any 
occasioned by his deletion of the Constitution’s guarantee of 
republican state governance.  I do not mean only that he 
managed once again, in Luther, to destroy a part of national 
power, although that is also true. 
The Court, by Chief Justice Taney, as we have seen, 
affirmed the judgment below in favor of the Charter 
government of Rhode Island, ruling that the case posed a 
“political question,” beyond the Court’s powers of decision.  But 
of course the Court actually did decide the case by letting stand 
 
 168.  There is a body of plausible opinion that initiative and referendum—
“direct democracy,” so-called—is inconsistent with the republican form of 
government—representational democracy—bequeathed to us by the 
Founders.  See, e.g., Norman R. Williams, Direct Democracy, The Guaranty 
Clause, and the Politics of the “Political Question” Doctrine: Revisiting Pacific 
Telephone, 87 OR. L. REV. 979 (2009); Justin Henderson, Comment, The 
Tyranny of the Minority: Is It Time to Jettison Ballot Initiatives in Arizona?, 
39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 963 (2007); Cody Hoesly, Comment, Reforming Direct 
Democracy: Lessons from Oregon, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1191 (2005); Robert G. 
Natelson, A Republic, Not A Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the 
Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807 (2002) (discussion by an 
expert on the issue); Hans A. Linde, Who Is Responsible for Republican 
Government?, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 709 (1994).  For an interesting 
development criticized from the left by a proponent of plebiscites, see 
Kathleen Garbacz, Note, Michigan Republicans’ Tactics to Evade Democracy 
Using Referendum-Proof Laws and Other Means, 16 J. L. SOC’Y 197 (2014).  
Cf. Mary Beard, Power to the People?, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (June 29, 
2016) (raising the analogous question, à propos of the 2016 “Brexit” 
referendum, whether “[h]anding us a referendum once every twenty years or 
so . . . in a fog of slogans and rhetoric, and allowing us all, on both sides, to 
vent our various discontents and prejudices in a yes/no vote is . . . a way to 
reach a responsible decision. . . . [or] a way to re-empower a disempowered 
electorate”). 
 169.  Pac. States, 223 U.S., at 150. 
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the Charter government in Rhode Island.170  In so doing, the 
Court left unremedied the real problem in Luther171—the 
disenfranchisement of unlanded adult white males in Rhode 
Island.172 
Leaving this grievance to fester was hardly an inevitable 
disposition of the case, however awkwardly the grievance was 
presented in Luther. To accomplish this, Chief Justice Taney 
shrewdly focused not on the very real unsolved problem of the 
disenfranchised white male residents of Rhode Island, but 
rather on a false problem—false because it never existed:  the 
supposed problem of a two-government state. In fact, the 
Charterite government was securely and solely governing 
Rhode Island throughout Dorr’s clamorous little rebellion, and 
at the time of the allegedly wrongful arrest, and so the Circuit 
Court ruled.173 Taney disingenuously stated outright that the 
Circuit Court below had ruled on the question, which of two 
existing rival governments was the legitimate government of 
the state.174 In fact, that court had expressly declined to do 
 
 170.  See Note, Political Rights, supra note 105, at 1128 (arguing that the 
Luther Court succeeded in insulating the fairness of the suffrage from judicial 
scrutiny).  
 171.  For oral arguments before the Supreme Court at the time of an 
earlier draft of this writing, on the issue that was the real issue in Luther—
the problem of entrenched rural power—see Oral Argument, Wittman v. 
Personhuballah, 2016 WL 1090257 (U.S.) (No. 14-1504); Oral Argument, 
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 2016 WL 524811 (U.S.) (No. 14-1280).  The 
Court unanimously disposed of Wittman on standing grounds, avoiding 
decision of the voting rights issue.  Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 
1732, 1735 (2016).  More recently, however, see Gill v. Whitford, 2017 WL 
1106512 (S.Ct. 2017) (contemplating hearing on the merits in a case of 
political gerrymandering in Wisconsin). 
 172.  The suffrage in the United States at the time was generally limited 
to white males.  Rhode Island was not unique in this respect.  However, as 
Justice Curtis pointed out, dissenting in Dred Scott, from time to time, a 
state had permitted freedmen to vote.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S., at 564 
(Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 173.  TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, supra note 86, at 23  “And the court, . . . 
refused to give the said instructions or to admit in evidence the facts offered 
to be proved by the plaintiff, . . . and did rule that the [Charter] government 
and laws, . . . were in full force and effect as the . . . government . . . of Rhode 
Island, and did constitute a justification of the acts of the defendants. . . .” 
 174.  Luther, 48 U.S., at 35. 
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so.175 
Addressing his imaginary two-government case, Chief 
Justice Taney warned darkly that judicial intervention would 
threaten the orderliness and stability of civil society within the 
state.  Adjudication would necessarily bring about chaotic 
conditions. Officials would cease to have authoritative 
governing power, and the police would cease to keep order, not 
knowing which government’s laws to enforce,176 or which 
officials were the true officials.177 
Yet such confusion would seem an unlikely consequence of 
judicial review of even a real two-government case.  When the 
parties have put their dispute before a court, they are seeking a 
final decision by an arbiter, a decision by which both are more 
or less resigned to be bound, as athletes are more or less 
resigned to bow to the decisions of umpires.  A judicial decision 
identifying the legitimate government in a two-government 
case would self-evidently allay, rather than aggravate, a 
conflict. 
The glaring exception that proves the rule is Dred Scott.  
That case was intended to settle for good the question whether 
slavery should be extended to the remaining territories.178  
Dred Scott’s answer was that slavery must be permitted in the 
territories, and indeed in the “free” states as well, at least 
insofar as Congress might wish to abolish slavery in the free 
states.  The Fifth Amendment protects property rights in the 
whole nation, and in antebellum thinking that included slave 
“property.”  By stripping Congress of power to come to a 
compromise on the question, Dred Scott became a chief cause of 
 
 175.  TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, supra note 86, at 38-39. 
 176.  Id. at 1, 38-39. 
 177.  For an actual struggle over the question whether officers remain 
officers de facto after arguable displacement, see State v. McFarland, 25 La. 
Ann. 547 (1873). 
 178.  Cf. James Buchanan, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1857), in 5 A 
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897 
430, 431 (James D. Richardson ed. 1897) (assuring the nation that the 
Supreme Court had the matter in hand and would settle the question of 
slavery in the territories for good).  Buchanan is now widely known to have 
been in correspondence with two of the Justices. 
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the Civil War.179  Dred Scott to the contrary notwithstanding, 
adjudication is probably the best mechanism we have to 
provide an answer—certainly in a case in which a two-
government case should arise—and thus to settle, rather than 
augment, the conflict. 
Taney also argued that a ruling in favor of the Dorrites 
could nullify all pre-existing laws and taxes.180  This awful 
doom was as imaginary as the aforementioned chaos.  A state 
does not nullify its pre-existing laws when it redistricts, 
reapportions, or otherwise revises its suffrage.  Even when the 
said laws might have been enacted by a government held to 
have been illegitimate, expedients suggested by Justice 
Brennan in Baker v. Carr,181 and in Justice Woodbury’s Luther 
dissent,182 would tend to preserve the legal status quo or 
provide an orderly transition.  The experience of even war-
ravaged nations is that, in the main life goes on, employees 
report for work, police report for duty, performing artists 
gather for rehearsals,183 stores open.  If only in sheer inertia, 
unless and until driven to flee, a populace keeps calm and 
soldiers on. 
 
 
 179.  The argument is spelled out in Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis, 
supra note 40, at 116-17 (introducing the argument that Dred Scott was a 
leading cause of the Civil War). 
 180.  Luther, 48 U.S., at 38-39. 
 181.  Baker, 369 U.S., at  219-20.  
 182.  Luther, 48 U.S., at 57-58. 
 183.  For a recent illustrative account, see, e.g., PAUL DU QUENOY, STAGE 
FRIGHT: POLITICS AND THE PERFORMING ARTS IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA (2013). 
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11.  Baker v. Carr 
In Baker v. Carr184 the Warren Court, by Justice Brennan, 
struck down Tennessee’s apportionment of its legislature—that 
is, the districting of its suffrage.185  In effect, the Court 
contemplated that the three-judge federal court below would 
order reapportionment of the state legislature before the next 
election.  It was a tremendous event in constitutional history. 
The Baker Court held that the legitimacy of a state’s 
allegedly malapportioned legislature was reviewable after all, 
Luther v. Borden to the contrary notwithstanding.186  Justice 
 
 184.  369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 185.  Baker, 369 U.S., at 209, 237.  For a recent discussion of the relation 
between Luther and Baker with respect to the problem in Baker of political 
gerrymandering, see Ari J. Savitzky, Note, The Law of Democracy and the 
Two Luther v. Bordens: A Counterhistory, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2028 (2011).  The 
author makes interesting use of Justice Woodbury’s opinion, reportedly a 
dissent, although justly terming it a concurrence, correctly viewing 
Woodbury’s argument from democratic theory as supporting Chief Justice 
Taney’s view of the non-justiciability of the question, which of two state 
governments is legitimate.  Id. at 2043.  Woodbury was emphatic that the 
Court “can never with propriety be called on officially to be the umpire” in 
such a dispute.  Luther, 48 U.S., at 51.  See also, e.g., Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, 
Reconsidering the Law of Democracy: Of Political Questions, Prudence, and 
the Judicial Role, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1899 (2006). 
 186.  In Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 126-27 (1986), the Supreme 
Court squarely held that political gerrymandering is subject to constitutional 
challenge, although the Justices differed on the standards that should govern 
such challenges.  Since then, however, while Bandemer ostensibly remains 
good law, the Court has declined to strike down political gerrymanders.  See 
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423 (2006); Vieth 
v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).  In Vieth, the plurality opinion for the Court 
again decried a lack of manageable standards for redistricting cases.  Vieth, 
541 U.S. at 267.  For recent commentary see, e.g., Michael Parsons, Clearing 
The Political Thicket: Why Political Gerrymandering for Partisan Advantage 
is Unconstitutional, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1107 (2016); Easha Anand, 
Finding a Path Through the Political Thicket: In Defense of Partisan 
Gerrymandering’s Justiciability, 102 CAL. L. REV. 917 (2014); J. Gerald 
Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform to Rein 
in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543 (2011).  On the 
other hand, the Court is committed to strict scrutiny of racial 
gerrymandering.  See  Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).  But given our 
identity politics, it is becoming apparent that racial gerrymandering is 
entangled with political gerrymandering.  See Adam B. Cox & Richard T. 
Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U. CHI. L. 
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Brennan, for the Court, felt it necessary to deal with Luther v. 
Borden, and found that that case was no obstacle.  American 
courts, with this, and under the Voting Rights Act of 1965,187 
have been scrutinizing state redistricting ever since.188 
 Indeed, the merits of challenges to redistrictings were 
being reached long before Baker.189  The Supreme Court’s 
recent attempt to gut the Voting Rights Act, striking down its 
Section 4(b), which had furnished the conditions for imposition 
of the pre-clearance requirement of Section 5,190 cannot alter 
the fact of judicial power under the Equal Protection Clause.  
And, notwithstanding the apparently dispositive distinction 
drawn by Justice Brennan between the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Guaranty Clause, in no important respect is 
Baker distinguishable from Luther, insofar as the two cases 
deal with entrenchment of a rural interest in the state 
legislature through effectual restriction of urban suffrage.191 
 
REV. 553 (2011). 
  The inseparability of racial from partisan gerrymandering is also 
becoming apparent to the Justices.  See Oral Argument, Wittman v. 
Personhuballah, 2016 WL 1090257 (U.S.) (No. 14-1504). at 6 (Chief Justice 
Roberts posing the question).  The Court punted in Wittman, unanimously 
disposing of the case on standing grounds.  Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 
S. Ct. 1732, 1735 (2016). 
 187.  Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq.). 
 188.  See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301 
(2016) (sustaining the Arizona Redistricting Commission’s packing of 
districts with minority voters when done in good-faith compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965).  What seems to be blocking judicial review now is 
not the “political-question” doctrine as such, or a lack of manageable 
standards, but an inability of the Court to distinguish racial gerrymandering 
from political gerrymandering.  See Oral Argument, Wittman v. 
Personhuballah, supra note 186 (question by Chief Justice Roberts).  That 
being so, in due course it may be necessary for the Court to begin to recognize 
the problem inherent in all gerrymandering:  the problem of entrenchment. 
 189.  See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Lassiter v. 
Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); Colegrove v. Green, 
328 U.S. 549 (1946); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285 
U.S. 355 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); Carroll v. Becker, 285 
U.S. 380 (1932); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); Davis v. Hildebrant, 
241 U.S. 565 (1916); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. (1 Cranch) 487 (1802). 
 190.  Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 191.  Baker, 369 U.S. at 220.  
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a. The Fourteenth Amendment Saved 
And yet Justice Brennan ruled that there was a difference.  
He distinguished Luther.  Justice Brennan distinguished 
Luther; he did not overrule it.  Justice Douglas, concurring, 
disagreed on the point, taking the view that Luther might as 
well be dispensed with.192 
 In coming to the rescue of Luther,  Justice Brennan could 
draw only a rather weak distinction between Baker and Luther.  
Baker, he simply said, relies on the Equal Protection Clause, 
whereas Luther had relied on the Guarantee Clause.193  In 
support of this he could only add that, although manageable 
standards had been thought unavailable under the Guarantee 
Clause, courts possessed quite manageable standards for cases 
under the Equal Protection Clause.194  But this was also a bald 
and unconvincing assertion.  Brennan might have argued that 
the Equal Protection Clause became available only after the 
enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments, and so could 
have been distinguished, since after-enacted, as supplying the 
deficiencies of the Guarantee Clause.  Yet Brennan did not 
make this argument.  He strained to state a difference without 
a distinction.  He strained to save Luther as in no way 
modified.  But why strain to save Luther at all? 
Let us pause for a moment to consider a plausible 
possibility, one which Justice Douglas, dissenting, seems not to 
have discerned, despite his usual penetration.  Justice Brennan 
was explicit, in Baker, that one of the governmental acts that 
needed to be protected from judicial scrutiny as a “political 
question” was the process by which constitutional amendments 
take effect.  This subject is not readily apparent to the casual 
reader of Brennan’s opinion, opaquely captioned as the 
 
 192.  Id. at 246. 
 193.  Justice Douglas, concurring, expressed the view, id. at 297-98, that 
this a distinction that made little difference, although he acknowledged that 
equal protection seemed to make a challenge to political malapportionment 
more a question of individual right than a public action; at the same time, the 
problem remained the same as the problem in Luther—the question whether 
one man’s vote should weigh more than another’s. 
 194.  Baker, 369 U.S. at 223. 
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amendment process is, as “Validity of enactments.”195  Consider 
that the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified in 1868, by 
states under military occupation, during Reconstruction.  That 
Amendment’s invaluable grant of individual rights as against 
state governments could conceivably be struck down if its 
ratification should be held unconstitutional under the 
Guarantee Clause.  This was not an unreal threat.  The 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were ratified by states 
arguably without a republican form of government, but instead, 
were ratified coercively, by states occupied by Union forces, 
under the Military Reconstructs Acts196—by a military form of 
government.  Thus, for Justice Brennan, ringing in the Equal 
Protection Clause as fresh news in no way derogating from 
Luther, was preferable to overruling Luther’s neutering of the 
Guarantee Clause197 to the extent the guarantee might pose a 
threat of judicial review of the forms of governments in the 
defeated South that had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment 
literally under the gun, and on threat of expulsion once again 
from Congress.  Ironically, in this light, Luther turns out to 
have had a beneficent use after all. 
 
b. The Entrenchment Problem 
In the situation in Tennessee that gave rise to Baker, 
Tennessee had retained its traditional districting practices, 
giving each rural voter many times the political power of urban 
voters, thus denying urban voters, as the Court held, the equal 
protection of the laws.198  The entrenchment of a permanently 
malapportioned legislature In Tennessee was obviously the 
direct consequence of malapportionment itself, in turn the 
 
 195.  Id. at 214.  The obscuring quality of the caption, and its casual 
placement amid others, suggests that Justice Brennan did not want this item 
to be particularly noticed—for the same reason that he had included it. 
 196.  Government of the Rebel States, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867); Rebel 
States, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867)  These statutes are commonly referred to as 
the Military Reconstruction Acts. 
 197.  See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375, 426 (2001) (connecting this reservation 
in Baker with a need to legitimize the Reconstruction Amendments).  The 
point was first raised, apparently, in Weinberg, Political Questions and the 
Guarantee Clause, supra note 109).  
 198.  Baker, at 188. 
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direct consequence of political gerrymandering, in turn (to 
come full circle) the very manifestation of a desire to protect 
(i.e., entrench) incumbencies.199  Tennessee’s agrarian 
legislature had repeatedly, after every decennial census, 
entrenched itself by bestowing undue voting strength upon its 
rural electorate.  Thus, as Justice Clark memorably wrote,  
“The people of Tennessee are stymied.”200 
 Stymied, indeed.  Justice Clark might have added that a 
similar situation could be observed in other states throughout 
the nation, and that malapportionment affected elections not 
only to the statehouse, but also to the House of 
Representatives, and to the Presidency of the United States.  
To the Warren Court, this pathological injustice to the voters 
could not be allowed to present an unadjudicable “political 
question.”  The malapportioned states would have to be 
reapportioned. 
Perhaps it is time to respect the views expressed in Baker 
v. Carr that political entrenchment by political 
gerrymandering, whether or not it can be seen as politics as 
usual, whether or not it is intended to protect incumbencies, 
and whether or not it is, in fact, racial gerrymandering, is a 
violation of the Constitution.  Political gerrymandering is also 
an affront to certain cherished aspirations in a democracy.  It is 
not enough simply to have a right to vote.  There is also a right 
to have one’s vote counted.201 
Today, moreover, it may be possible to quantify the Court’s 
workhorse concept of vote “dilution” in a meaningful way.  A 
technique of counting “wasted votes” has been proposed, which, 
if not chimerical, might assist courts in identifying and 
 
 199.  For interesting recent discussion of the equal protection problem 
inherent in intentional political gerrymandering, see, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, 
Justifying a Revised Voting Rights Act: The Guarantee Clause and the 
Problem of Minority Rule, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1551 (2014). 
  200.  Baker, 369 U.S. at 259. 
 201.  For characterization of the Supreme Court’s post-Baker indifference 
to the problem of entrenchment in redistricting cases as “ineptitude,” see 
Savitsky, The Law of Democracy, supra note 40, at 2028.  (“How, and how 
much, does the Constitution protect against political entrenchment? Judicial 
ineptitude in dealing with this question—on display in the modern Court’s 
treatment of partisan gerrymandering—has its roots in Luther v. Borden.”). 
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measuring abusive redistricting.202  It has also become possible, 
if only at the state level,203 to require redistricting to be done by 
an independent commission.204  However, it is not clear that 
this technique defeats either entrenchment of incumbencies or 
political gerrymandering more generally.205 
 
 
 202.  See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan 
Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015) 
(arguing that the numbers of “wasted votes” in packed and cracked districts 
can be ascertained and can supply useful standards for long-awaiting judicial 
review of entrenchment through partisan gerrymandering).  But see, e.g., 
Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, ___ 
TEX. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2017) (on file with the Texas Law Review) 
(concluding that it is for the political branches, in the main, to attack the 
problem of the formation of an oligarchy).  For general discussion of the 
institutional question raised by Fishkin and Forbath, see, e.g., Vicki C. 
Jackson, Pro-Constitutional Representation: Comparing the Role Obligations 
of Judges and Elected Representatives in Constitutional Democracy, 57 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1717 (2016). 
 203.  Bills in the 112th Congress proposing independent redistricting 
commissions in the states went nowhere.  See, e.g., H.R. 453, 112th Cong. 
(2011); H.R. 590, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 3846, 112th Cong. (2012); S. 694, 
112th Cong. (2011). 
 204.  See, e.g., Arizona Ind. Redistricting Comm’n, 229 Ariz. 347, 275 P.3d 
1267 (2012); State Legislative Districts, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/State-by-state_redistricting_procedures (last visited 
Apr. 8, 2017) “Independent commissions draw the lines for both state 
legislative and congressional districts in six states: Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Idaho, Montana and Washington.  Specific membership 
requirements for these commissions vary from state to state.  Generally 
speaking, however, these commissions do not include legislators or other 
elected officials.”  Id. 
 205.  See generally Justin Levitt, “All About Redistricting,” at 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/; see, e.g., Reply Brief for Appellants, McCrory v. 
Harris, 2016 WL 6769006 (2016) (No. 15-1262)  (discussing this and related 
issues). 
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12.  A Piece of a Puzzle 
What motivated Chief Justice Taney’s meretricious opinion 
in Luther?  While purporting to insulate courts from “questions 
in their nature political,”206 did  Taney have some political 
project of his own in view?  Probing Luther v. Borden at a 
deeper level, I would suggest that—beyond its permission to 
malapportioned state legislatures to entrench themselves—
Luther has a darker side. 
We have already seen that Luther functioned to insulate 
disproportionate rural voting strength from judicial oversight.  
We can see that the Chief Justice’s opinion in Luther left in 
place, with no chance of judicial remediation, significant state 
disenfranchisements of urban citizens, as well as of rural 
citizens too poor to have holdings in land.  In the slave states, 
an enfranchised rural class might have included some 
landowners too poor to own slaves.  But even allowing for such 
possibilities, Luther functioned to pump up land-rich voting 
strength, and this necessarily entrenched the slave states’ pro-
slavery legislatures.  In the slave states, this entrenchment of 
elite rural power made possible the stifling of the states’ 
antislavery urban and hill-country voices in state government, 
while it created and supported a countryside aristocracy, very 
like the rich gentry depicted in the novels of Jane Austen. 
Interestingly, this oligarchy-forming consequence of 
suffrage arrangements such as Rhode Island’s were well 
understood at the time in the halls of Congress.  Consider the 
following remarks from a House Report of 1839: 
We may shrink from the idea of an aristocracy; but 
the best historians inform us that there was never yet a 
commonwealth without . . . its order of hereditary 
nobility . . .  And that there is in this country . . . 
unavoidably produced by the power, patronage, and 
influence inseparable from the possession of all the great 
and minor offices of government, we must be dull indeed 
not to know. . . .  Your committee are too deeply 
impressed with the importance of the subject . . . to close 
 
 206.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
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this report without presenting at least a partial view . . . 
of the dangers by which a free people are encompassed, 
without hope of escape, when the elective franchise is 
suffered to fall into the hands of those who are at all 
times the fit and ready instruments of ambitious 
individuals.  Power over the people and their rights, in a 
free State, can only be obtained, in the first instance, by 
the aid of voters.207 
We can trace the effect of skewed slave state suffrage at all 
levels of government.  The planter power that was built into 
the suffrage of states with property qualifications for office (or 
other ways of weighing the elite rural vote more heavily than 
other votes, whether through real property qualifications or by 
overtly malapportioned districting, had pervasive effects on 
government. 
Consider the government of the state. Obviously the 
governor, being elected by the majority of those voting, is 
directly affected by a suffrage available only to land-owning 
voters.  The nomination and election of a pro-slavery governor 
of a slave state was clearly in the hands of the planter class.  
There would be the important contribution of the yeomen, of 
course.  But, like the rural poor with neither a slave or a vote, 
the yeomen who had a vote would—as the Civil War was to 
demonstrate—fight and die for white supremacy, and were as 
likely to vote for it.  Bear in mind that it is the governor who 
can veto a bill or sign it into law. 
Also self-evidently, a planter-favoring suffrage produced 
pro-planter legislatures.  In Rhode Island, elite rural voting 
power was further enhanced by the number of state 
representatives the planters and yeomen of the state could vote 
for.  Under the terms of Rhode Island’s old royal charter, every 
incorporated village and town was entitled to have the same 
number of representatives in the state’s General Assembly as 
Providence was accorded.  A small plantation could incorporate 
as a village and be allotted two representatives in the General 
 
 207.  See B. Hazard, Report of the Committee on the Subject of an 
Extension of Suffrage, House of Representatives (1839) (referenced in 
TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORD, supra note 86, at 23). 
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Assembly.  In Southern legislatures, the weight of the rural 
suffrage helped stifle anti-slavery urban, seaport, and hill 
country voices in the state legislatures, and thus in the very 
laws.  Moreover, legislators have no quarrel with the suffrage 
that put them in office.  In consequence, the South’s pro-
slavery legislatures could, and did, entrench themselves. 
As for the state judiciary, obviously a planter-dominated 
suffrage in the South meant heavy planter influence in the 
states’ elected judiciaries.  This meant that the common law 
itself, in its bearing on slavery, became distinctive to the South. 
It is reasonable to suppose that entrenched antebellum 
planter hegemony in the courts as well as the legislatures 
enshrined planters’ customs, whether enacted by planters’ 
legislatures and signed into law by planters’ governors, or 
developed as common law by planters’ chosen judges.  In 
typical slave states, the presence of free blacks was 
outlawed.208  Slaves were stripped of independent will in all 
matters.209   There was a racial presumption of slavery, and the 
will of the slave was the will of the master.  Except for 
occasional local law to the contrary, slave-states’ laws put the 
slaves’ very lives at their masters’—and perhaps other 
whites’—disposal.210 
Now consider the federal government.  The influences we 
have noted extended beyond the state to the federal 
government in Washington, D.C.  The South’s vital coalition 
with Northern Democrats—the banking, textile, and shipping 
interests that depended on Southern cotton—functioned as a 
bulwark of planter hegemony in the coalition that was the 
 
 208.  See Luther, 48 U.S., at 1 (Howard, Reporter, stating, that there were 
two cases on these facts brought up from the Circuit Court below; adding, 
“They were argued at the preceding term of the court, and held under 
advisement until the present.”  There was a similar reworking of the question 
for decision in Dred Scott.  Originally conceived of by the Court as raising 
questions of jurisdiction, see Dred Scott, 60 U.S., at 518 (opinion of Catron, 
J.), the question was revised to deal with the constitutionality of the Missouri 
Compromise. 
 209.  See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW 
1619-1860 (1996). 
 210.  See, e.g., Neal v. Farmer, 9 Ga. 555, 582-83 (1851) (holding it not a 
felony to kill a slave). 
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Democratic Party.  Stunningly, the malapportioned legislatures 
of the South were able, in coalition with Northern Democrats, 
to put the slave interest first even in the halls of the national 
government.211 
Consider, first, the Senate.  In antebellum days, and 
indeed until 1913, the state legislatures chose the state’s 
senators.  It was as late as 1913 that the Seventeenth 
Amendment was passed, requiring direct election to the 
Senate.  Thus, the entrenched pro-slavery Southern 
legislatures were peopling the United States Senate with 
Senators of their own choosing.  To a significant extent the 
antebellum Senate had become obedient to planter will.  
Furthermore, planter power in the Senate was much enhanced 
by the unamendable provision in the Constitution that accords 
two, and only two, Senators to each state.212  This meant that 
less populous slave states like Arkansas or Delaware could 
assert planter interests in the United States Senate on a level 
of equality with the populous free states of the North. 
Now consider the House of Representatives.  Through the 
favored rural suffrage typical of the states—and not only those 
in the special plight of Rhode Island—planter power would 
have been reflected in the election of members of the House of 
Representatives in Washington, D.C.  This effect was 
significantly enhanced not only by the planters’ 
disproportionate voting strength, but also by the number of 
congressmen they could vote for.  The Constitution’s “Three-
Fifths Clause”213 provided that three-fifths of the slave 
population “counted” for purposes of representation in the 
House.214  This, despite the fact that the slaves themselves 
 
 211.  For a current analysis, see 2 JOHN ASHWORTH, SLAVERY, CAPITALISM, 
AND POLITICS IN THE ANTEBELLUM REPUBLIC  104 ff. (2007). 
 212.  U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 3. 
 213.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV 
(“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States . . . 
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding 
to the whole Number of free Persons . . . three fifths of all other Persons.”).  
The enumerated exceptions were for apprentices and Indians living within a 
tribe; the count was to be accomplished by decennial census.   Id. 
 214.  Nothing in Luther was needed to protect the three-fifths of slaves 
added to the voting strength of slave states by the Constitution itself.  U.S. 
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could not vote.  Moreover, the effect of the Three-Fifths Clause 
was magnified over time, as antebellum Northerners, in 
obedience to “gradual emancipation” laws, simply sold their 
slaves, literally, down the river215—while most Northern states 
denied the vote to freedmen living there.216 
But we must not forget the President.  The total population 
in the states determines each state’s number of electors in the 
Electoral College, but not as a simple proportion. The slave 
states had the benefit of the Three-Fifths Clause, inflating 
their voting strength.  Their voting strength also benefited 
from the disproportionate representation of the smaller states 
in the electoral college.  Moreover, from 1831 on, after a novel 
party nominating convention was held in Baltimore, the 
nominees for President and Vice-President were selected in 
national party conventions, the delegates to which were chosen 
by the political party organizations within each state, and thus 
by the predominant power within the state—which in the 
South was planter power. 
Bear in mind that the President, almost always, for 
reasons we are beginning to understand, a Southerner or a 
South-leaning Northerner, had the naming of Justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, and the Judges of the 
lower federal courts as well.  To be sure, the Senate can control 
the President’s judicial nominees, but, as we have also seen, in 
the antebellum period the South generally controlled the 
Senate.  This was the South-dominated Senate which, until 
1913, was elected by the rural-dominated state legislatures—in 
the South, planter-dominated state legislatures.217 
 
CONST. art. I § 2 clearly served as another pillar of slave-state power in 
Washington, D.C. 
 215.  For recent discussion see generally CONGRESS AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
SECTIONALISM: FROM THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE TO THE AGE OF JACKSON (Paul 
Finkelman & Donald R. Kennon eds., 2008); Paul Finkelman, States’ Rights, 
Southern Hypocrisy, and the Crisis of the Union, 45 AKRON L. REV. 449 
(2012); and other works of Paul Finkelman cited therein. 
 216.  Cf. Dred Scott, 60 U.S., at 413-15 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (pointing 
out that black persons had an early right to vote in New York and New 
Jersey, and at the time of decision in Dred Scott, had the right to vote in New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts.  Of course this implies that black freedmen 
lacked the right to vote elsewhere or in other times). 
 217.  Recall that the state legislatures elected the state’s Senators until 
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All of these arrangements had their effect, then, not only 
in the South, but in Washington, D.C., and not only in the 
Senate but also in the House; and in presidential elections, 
and, through South-leaning Presidents, with the consent of the 
South-leaning Senate, in the Supreme Court and indeed all 
federal courts.  The Taney Court was nothing if not a states’ 
rights Court, and not a few of its states’ rights opinions could 
read as pro-South, pro-slavery opinions. 
Luther v. Borden entrenched the (still persisting!) 
privileging of rural voters in the suffrage of the states, and in 
its day the privileging of elite rural voters, insulating that 
unfairness from judicial review.  Through this mechanism, 
Luther worked to permit the South virtually to hold the strings 
of power in this country, in all branches, executive, legislative, 
and judicial, at all levels, state and federal.  
This is a shocking discovery.  
 
13.  The “Slave Power” 
This, then was the “Slave Power.”218  This was the 
mysterious force that yielded the persistent domination of the 
slave South in all three branches of the federal government 
throughout the antebellum period.  This was the mysterious 
force that perplexed and frightened Northerners.  “Mysterious” 
because the South was falling behind. 
 Of course the South was very rich—the region comprised 
one of the world’s largest economies.  And cotton was king.  But 
the South was not advancing in the way that the developing, 
industrializing and urbanizing North was advancing.  The 
South blamed its backwardness on the greed of Northern 
bankers and shippers.  The prestige of Southern elites and the 
wealth of the region were not based on industries and cities, 
but on the possession of land and slaves.  Southerners did not 
see that the blame for Southern backwardness, at root, lay, not 
so much with Northern predations as with the Southern 
commitment to slavery. 
 
the Seventeenth Amendment provided for direct popular election of Senators. 
 218.  See generally LEONARD L. RICHARD, THE SLAVE POWER:  THE FREE 
NORTH AND SOUTHERN DOMINATION (2009).  
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The South’s population profited from immigration, but 
immigrants tended to want to go where the jobs were, where 
they would not have to compete with slave labor.  So the 19th 
century flood of immigrants to this country was much more of a 
flood in the North than in the South.  And the North’s larger 
share of immigrants threatened Southern dominance in the 
national government.  Political power, in a democracy, 
ultimately must depend on population. 
Early in the period, John C. Calhoun presciently began 
arguing for a “concurrent voice” for the South as a minority.  As 
the storm gathered, Calhoun published his Disquisition on 
Government, elaborating on this demand.219 
To aggravate the South’s difficulties, there was developing 
a sad change in the very nature of Southern dependence on 
slavery, a change that needed to be accommodated, from the 
South’s point of view, in national politics.  To win the embrace 
of the new reality by the national government, political power 
was of the essence.  For, on the exhausted soils of the border 
states of the Old South, cotton had become a king in exile.  
More and more, the livelihood of the planters, dependent as 
ever on black slavery, was coming to depend on the awful 
business of breeding and selling the slaves themselves. 
 By the 1850s, planters in the border slave states were 
pushing hard for the extension of slavery into the Western 
territories, and were joined in their politics by sympathizers in 
the deep South.  Since Western lands were not well adapted to 
plantation-style agriculture, the push for the extension of 
slavery into the territories seems to have been a push for an 
expanded market for slaves.  The Kansas-Nebraska Act had 
opened up the unorganized territories to the possibility of 
slave-state status.220  To be sure, the West seemed inhospitable 
to plantation-style agriculture.  But Southerners entertained 
hopes that slaves would be needed for mining, domestic and 
 
 219.  JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT (1851) (2015).  
See generally JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY: 
1789-1861 (1930). 
 220.  Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, 10 Stat. 277 (authorizing the people 
in the remaining Western territories to elect slave status, and repealing the 
Missouri Compromise of 1820 to that extent). 
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ordinary farm uses.  It was partly to oppose the territorial 
extension of slavery—and to seek repeal of the Kansas-
Nebraska Act—that Abraham Lincoln had come out of political 
retirement.221 
To Northerners, the “Slave Power” that had achieved the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, opening up the Western territories to 
slavery, seemed inexplicable.  It is a measure of the force 
behind this mysterious Slave Power that on the very eve of the 
Civil War, with Southern grievance at its most acute, and the 
South threatening secession, the South still had the Senate and 
still had the Supreme Court.  Secession would be precipitated 
only by the South’s loss of the Presidency. 
In my view, the “Slave Power” is best understood, in the 
main, as a function of the solid South’s position in the coalition 
that was the Democratic party.  But that begs the antecedent 
question of the solidness of the South.  In writing this paper, I 
have come to think it more accurate to see the phenomenon as 
specifically planter, rather than Southern, dominance, and, 
more specifically, the dominance of the slave interest.  The 
slave interest was abetted by Northern business and shipping 
interests in the cotton and tobacco trade, facilitated by the 
Democratic Party coalition, augmented in the House of 
Representatives and the Electoral College by the Three-Fifths 
Clause,222 by the endowment of two senators for every state 
(without possibility of amendment,223) by a Senate chosen by 
the state legislatures, and by judiciaries populated by these 
forces. 
 
 221.  The story is told in Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis, supra note 
40. 
 222.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  This clause states: 
Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States 
which may be included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for 
a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all 
other Persons. 
 223.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall 
be composed of two Senators from each State . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. V 
(“[P]rovided that . . . no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its 
equal suffrage in the Senate.”). 
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But something more must be added to the account.  Why 
was it the urban elites who rose up in the Dorr Rebellion?  Why 
was it not the rural poor?224  And here, the importance of the 
ideology of white supremacy may be the key.  The country poor, 
who would become the brave soldiers of the Confederate army, 
are, I think, most plausibly understood as dignified in their 
very sense of selfhood by white supremacy.225  The ideology of 
white supremacy also was current among both urban and rural 
elites, to be sure, but personal dignity in the upper classes 
could thrive on the additional nourishment of education and 
the wealth and social prestige that ownership of land and 
slaves could provide. 
To anti-slavery observers, the predominance of the slave 
interest in all three branches of the national government, in 
the face of the superior and advancing wealth and population of 
the free states,226 was intolerable—and beyond understanding.  
It was this feature of antebellum politics—the uncanny ability 
of the antebellum South, in its relative decline vis-à-vis the 
industrializing, urbanizing, flourishing North, time and again 
to control all three branches of the federal government—this 
persistent triumph of the backward South—that led 
 
 224.  I am grateful to Willy Forbath for the important counter-argument 
that enfranchising the rural poor would have made a difference in Southern 
and national politics.  As always, he is very persuasive, but I do not share 
that view. 
 225.  See Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis, supra note 40, at 135 & n. 
131. 
 226.  See E. A. POLLARD, THE LOST CAUSE (1867) at 54-64 (discussing “The 
Material Decline of the South in the Union”); JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH 
AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY: 1789-1861 (1930); Weinberg, Dred Scott and the 
Crisis, supra note 40 (arguing that slavery in the South determined the 
preference of immigrants to settle in the North, and seeing the consequent 
growth of Northern population as posing a threat to Southern political power 
in Washington, culminating in the South’s delusional struggle in the 1850s 
for new slave states to be carved out of the remaining territories, and, in the 
last agony of the crisis, in the South’s inability to prevent the election of 
Abraham Lincoln).  Also convincingly positing that it was slavery itself that 
made the under-development and backwardness of the South inevitable, see 
the contemporaneous views of a Southerner, HINTON HELPER, THE IMPENDING 
CRISIS OF THE SOUTH (1857); see also Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis, 
supra note 40. 
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Northerners to posit a mysterious “Slave Power.”227 
It is not implausible to impute to Chief Justice Taney, as a 
conscious intention, these likely consequences of his opinion in 
Luther v. Borden.  Such an intention would be consistent with  
Taney’s efforts, throughout his career, to further the pro-
slavery interest, and in that interest to support the powers and 
autonomy of the states.  But intended or not, from the day it 
was decided, Luther v. Borden necessarily functioned as a 
bulwark of the national power of the slave states. 
Seeing Luther as the voting-rights case that it was, we can 
also see that, in shutting down litigation challenging undue 
rural voting strength, Luther v. Borden obviously functioned, in 
the antebellum slave states, to empower planter voting 
strength,228—that is, pro-slavery power. 
To be sure, in myriad other ways, the political power of 
elite classes everywhere is obvious and explains itself.  
Numerous hypotheses plausibly suggest how it was that the 
Southern planter class came to dominate antebellum 
government, not only in the Southern states, but in 
Washington, D.C.  There has been little consensus on the 
question, but the phenomenon of planter hegemony will always 
be unsurprising—it will always be easy to attribute to one or 
another social or political characteristic of the antebellum 
period.  The contemporaneous observer, John Cairnes, quite 
rightly thought numerous factors lay behind planter hegemony, 
although he stressed the power of planter patronage.229  
 
 227.  See also  THEODORE PARKER, THE SLAVE POWER (James K. Hosmer ed. 
1916); II HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER 
IN AMERICA (1874) (identifying and decrying planter hegemony even in 
national politics); LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER: THE FREE NORTH 
AND SOUTHERN DOMINATION, 1780-1860 (2000); HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF 
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA (3 vols. 1872) (studying 
the phenomenon of planter hegemony); but see DAVID B. DAVIS, THE SLAVE 
POWER CONSPIRACY AND THE PARANOID STYLE (1970) (taking the view that “the 
slave power” was a myth).  There is little or no reference in these works to 
Luther v. Borden. 
 228.  Southern yeomen, of course, also had the vote in property-
qualification states, but would share the white-supremacy ideology of the 
planters and rural poor alike. 
 229.  JOHN E. CAIRNES, THE SLAVE POWER: ITS CHARACTER, CAREER, AND 
PROBABLE DESIGNS (2d ed. 1863). 
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Eugene Genovese attributed planter power to adroit marriages 
and other alliances between planters and capitalists.230  Alan 
Gallay focused on the enduring connection between land-
ownership and political hegemony.231  Other writers classify 
the old planter class with ruling elites in all societies 
throughout history.  And, of course, there were differences 
among the states.  In some slave states, the planters were less 
powerful than in others, and the views of Southern yeomen did 
not always coincide with the views of the planter grandees.232 
 
Conclusion:  A Taney Court Mystery Solved 
This paper is not intended to explain the wellsprings of 
planter hegemony in the antebellum slave states.  That 
question hardly wants for answers, as we have just seen.  
Although our reading of Luther v. Borden has identified that 
case’s functioning, in effect, as one support of the antebellum 
phenomenon of planter power, and thus as one support of the 
curious power of the slave states in antebellum politics on the 
national as well as the state scene, other multiple complex 
causes and effects are undoubtedly involved in malapportioned 
local suffrage in national politics.  Other causes of slave power 
in national politics certainly included the South’s long 
participation in the Democratic Party coalition.  We must 
remember, too, the well-anthologized states’ rights cases 
handed down in the Taney Court period. 
In light of our study of Luther v. Borden, it is hoped that 
that case—its prolix disingenuous discussions of political 
questions, of the Guarantee Clause, and of supposedly anarchic 
conditions to be brought about by the Supreme Court’s settling 
of a vanished controversy—will seem a little less plausible to 
today’s reader.  And it is hoped that Luther v. Borden will 
 
 230.  EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY 191 
(1967). 
 231.  See generally ALAN GALLAY, THE FORMATION OF A PLANTER ELITE: 
JONATHAN BRYAN AND THE SOUTHERN COLONIAL FRONTIER 55-108 (1989) 
(discussing the political influence of the planter class).  Gallay does not 
include Luther v. Borden or property qualifications for the suffrage in his 
study. 
 232.  See, e.g., JAMES B. SELLERS, SLAVERY IN ALABAMA (Harriet E. Amos 
Doss ed. 1994). 
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become somewhat more comprehensibly the work of Chief 
Justice Roger Brooke Taney.  We can now, if we will, see 
Luther v. Borden’s darker side.  We can see how Luther secured 
from judicial intervention the force that drove and nourished 
“the Slave Power,” extending its reach over all branches of 
government at all levels, even in the face of the obvious and 
accelerating decline of the slave South.  We can now discern 
the likely intentions of the author of that darkest of all 
Supreme Court cases, Dred Scott v. Sandford. 
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